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JURISDICTION: 
This appeal is from a final Judgment and orders of the Seventh District Court, 
Honorable Judge Douglas Thomas. This Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j). 
ISSUES: 
Issue No.l: Did appellants produce sufficient evidence to hold HTK liable for the 
recommendation of BHDC where appellants relied on Campbell/Five Star's appearance of 
authority to give investment advice and were never informed of their termination from HTK? 
[TR4214-24; 6721-43; 5831-40] The review of the trial court's granting of summary 
judgment involves questions of law which are reviewed for coiTectness with no deference 
to the trial court. Haik v. Sandy City, 2011 UT 26, [^10. 
Issue No.2: Did the trial court err when it ruled HTK owed no duties of care to 
appellants following the termination of their registered representative? [TR4228-35; 6748-
60; 5845-51] The determination of whether a legal duty exists is entirely a question of law. 
Normandean v. Hanson Equip., Inc., 2009 UT 44, fl 8. Legal questions such as the existence 
of a duty and its scope are reviewed for correctness with no deference to the trial court. 
McLaughlin v Schenck, 2009 UT 64, %\A. 
Issue No.3: Does the participation of HTK's actual and apparent agents in the sale 
of BHDC constitute material aid in the sale of unregistered securities? [TR4225-26; 6745-48; 
5844-45] The review of the trial court's granting of summary judgment involves questions 
-1-
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of law which are reviewed for correctness with no deference to the trial court. Haik v. Sandy 
CzYy, 2011UT 26, f 10. 
Issue No.4: Did the trial court err in striking appellants' evidence of HTK's control 
person liability as prejudicial to HTK where the evidence corrected an inaccurate record 
created by HTK? [TR5840-43; 6744-45; 5840-43] The trial court's striking of appellants' 
evidence in support of HTK's control person liability is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
Cabaness v. Thomas, 2010 UT 23, ^50. 
Issue No.5: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in rejecting appellants' attorneys' 
fees without evaluating the factors for award of reasonable contingent fees? [TR5803-11; 
6117-23] The trial court's calculation of reasonable attorneys' fees is reviewed for an abuse 
of discretion. Softsohitions, Inc. v. Brigham Young Univ., 2000 UT 46, f^ 12. 
Issue No. 6: Did the trial court err when it ruled the Release between Grant Howell 
and Penn Mutual was clear and unambiguous despite language limiting the Release to 
Howell's insurance policy? [TR1238-46] Questions of contract interpretation are reviewed 
for correctness. Holladay Towne Ctr., L.L.C. v. Brown Family Holdings, L.L.C., 2011 UT 
9,118. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 
Appellee Hornor, Townsend & Kent ("HTK") is a broker-dealer of securities and 
investment products. [TR1832] HTK licenses registered representatives to act on its behalf. 
[TR4560; 4435] HTK entered into Registered Representative Contracts with Jeff Campbell, 
-2-
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Frank Wheeler, Fred Davis and Mary Alger. [TR4680-81; 4698-4700; 4360-61; 4435] These 
persons represented HTK in Price, Utah under the name Five Star Financial Group. 
[TR4376-77; 4359-61] 
The Beverly Hills Development Company ("BHDC") was a real estate scam operated 
out of Alpine, Utah by Michael Fitzgerald. Jeff Campbell first spoke to his HTK supervisor 
about selling BHDC notes in mid-2002. [TR4358; 4678-79] Less than a year prior, the 
NASD issued Notice to Members 01-79, plainly outlining promissory note scams like 
BHDC. [TR4201; 4281-82; 6766-686] FITK relayed this information to its representatives 
in its newsletter and recommended its representatives review the scam in the Top 10 Scams 
List from securities regulators. [TR4807] 
Yet, Campbell explained to his supervisor the BHDC investments would involve 
promissory notes backed by property, so the notes were not securities. [TR4408-09; 4415] 
Knowing that Notice 01-79 outlined this precise type of scam, HTK was not fooled and 
Campbell's compliance manager told him the BHDC notes were indeed securities. [TR4380] 
Undeterred, in November, 2002, Campbell surrendered his securities license and 
resigned from HTK. [TR4397] HTK understood it was important for the remaining HTK 
representatives at Five Star to distinguish themselves from Campbell. [TR4381] HTK was 
concerned that since the representatives had worked together with Campbell in the past, 
clients could perceive they were also involved in BHDC. [TR4548] 
Despite its concerns, FITK never instructed Campbell to sever ties with the remaining 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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HTK representatives. [TR4410] HTK never recommended its agents leave the office or 
change the signs. [TR4552-53] The representatix cs did not change their stationary, business 
card^-. oliice >igns. DIIK\ v-'oi-ii. ;i!Mi" •• .•• >!^ .ii ' - -.••.' | ikiM-- * 
l i i k rept\srntati\c Wheeler referred customers to Campbell to invest in BHDC, HTK 
representatixe Alger handled the paperwork and pui Hu- files together lor each BHDC 
investor, and M'i'K' representative Da\i>, actual _ • ••- c^ / ;:--i. - h ;=K ;-W->-»" •- 3; 
4431); - 1 436] 
Thus, as HTK knew would happen, appellants, who w ere HTK/Five Star customers, 
were pitched BHDC investments at HTK's office through Campbell. [TR4193-96] Campbell 
did i lotl lii lg to ii lfon i 11 lis cliei its of 1 lis let i i lii lation ft c ).n: l If 1 1 K [ I R •• 1 1-16 1 / ] I I I K took, i 10 
action to notify customers of Campbell's termination. [TR4382; 4370; 4433] IITK likewise 
took no action io notify customers BHDC was not authorized by HTK. [TR4382; 4371] 
Appellants invested ;;, ii, -i n ,• lost their entity investments. 
SfiNi :\ i,\K y__yl • M<S * k A r ^ A i - : 
HTK moved for summary judgment against appellant Ikwell based on his signing of 
a Release with WTV-*: parent company, Penn Muti ml (Issue No. 6). The trial court granted 
I ITK k; i i lotic -i i. \ |: jpellai it I Io -ell aj >peah ; tl lat t I ilii ig basec "1 oi i tl ic ar i ibigi lity of tl le Rek ase 
and asks his claim be remai ided for determination by a jury. 
HTK then moved for summary judgment on the remaining appellants' claims based 
oi I apparent ai ill 101 ii; 7 negliger it si ipei visioi i ai I ; I dolatioi is c f tl it "I Itah I It tifon r i Scci irities 
-4-
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Act (Issue Nos. 1-4). The trial court granted HTK's motion. Appellants appeal that ruling 
because they produced sufficient evidence they reasonably relied on the appearance of 
authority generated by HTK's sponsorship of Campbell and Five Star when they invested in 
BHDC. Appellants also presented sufficient evidence HTK owed them duties of care to 
support a negligence claim which survived Campbell's termination from HTK. Finally, 
appellants produced sufficient evidence HTK was liable for Campbell's sale of unregistered 
securities under the "material aid" and/or "control person" provisions of Utah's securities act. 
Appellants seek remand of these issues for trial by jury. 
Following HTK's dismissal, appellants proceeded to trial against Campbell/Five Star 
Financial and obtained a jury verdict in their favor. Appellants requested attorneys' fees in 
accordance with Utah's securities statute and HTK objected (Issue No. 5). The trial court 
rejected appellants' fee request because appellants did not sufficiently distinguish the hours 
spent on their claims against Campbell from those against HTK. Appellants appeal this 
ruling because there is no such requirement in a contingent fee case. Appellants presented 
evidence of the complexity of the litigation, the work performed, the risks taken, and the 
results obtained. This is the evidence which the trial court should have considered. 
Appellants ask for remand of the attorneys' fee issue. 
-5-
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ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANTS PRODUCED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO HOLD HTK 
LIABLE FOR THE RECOMMENDATK >\ OF Rl I DC 
Appellants1 i aised a questioi 1 ot fact wl letl iet tl icy relied 01 i Cai i ipbell /.Fiv e Star's 
apparent authoiit}/ to invest in BI IDC w here they relied on 111 K and Campbell for 
investment advice and were never informed offis termination from IITK. IJtal1 follovvs the 
Restatement *dcfn;nuHDi apparentanth. \\\\ a^'condu.. i - •= ;•• . :n;,M<;u o inch, reasonably 
on his behalf by the person purporting to act for him." Litddington v. Bodenvest, Ltd., 855 
P.2d 204. 200 frtah 109U quoting Restatement (Second of Agency § 27. 
/ M I , - . , - • • . . . - • • • ' : ! : 
exercise of authority; 2) appellants reasonably believed their agents possessed authority; and 
3) suffered damage as a result ofincir i chance on (he appearance of authority. Liiddington, 
fro" .-'AI at ! - "nueslions of agency and an agent:- tjboritv on, n^Mx A ,\ he 
r e ^ o ' • ., - \ . i : ' . • .  .5, ;:,- j ; U " - - T •!• V\ '- . '• • l \ u'i Oi a i l 
agencv relationship or auihoi il\." E.A. Prince & Son, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co., 818 F.Supp. 
oin o p c D ^ f lOO^XemphasiMiioiii .nal). 
1
 i i k ! i ' ; i . utirl iouiiu .i =; lerent reasons to dismiss each appellant's claim. >• 
appeilanis Burdick, Temples, Marqucz, Hunter and Jordan are reviewed individual! 
this section. Appellants Manus, Henrie and Swinburne did not appeal this ruling. 
-6-
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Appellant Frank Burdick 
The trial court dismissed Mr. Burdick's apparent authority claim stating he produced 
no evidence he relied on HTK to invest in BHDC. Appellants and the court disagreed 
regarding what was required for this reliance element. Appellants argued Luddington 
required only reliance on the appearance of authority, whereas the trial court insisted the 
reliance must be on a specific principal.2 As explained below, in opposing summary 
judgment, Mr. Burdick produced sufficient evidence to satisfy either theory. Yet, the trial 
court additionally abused its discretion by refusing to consider evidence on reconsideration 
which created a question of fact. 
Specifically, appellants moved for reconsideration and produced the evidence the trial 
court wanted, i.e. declarations they relied on HTK, its investment advice, its 
recommendation, and their belief Campbell represented HTK when they invested in BHDC. 
[TR676d-692-702)]3; see Nyman v. McDonald, 966 P.2d 1210, 1213 (Utah App. 
1998)(finding cc[o]ne sworn statement under oath is all that is necessary to create a factual 
issue, thereby precluding summary judgment.") The trial court rejected the evidence as 
untimely and, more candidly, as raising questions of fact. [TR6156] The trial court stated, 
2
 The court explained, "[a]t no time does Mr. Burdick indicate . . . that he invested 
in BHDC because of HTK. Never says that. He never says, you know, it was because of 
HTK that I thought it was okay to invest in BHDC. Or, I thought it would be a good idea 
to invest in BHDC because I knew that HTK was there. Never said that.*' [TR6081]. 
3
 The italicized pin cite 6766-[ ], indicates a document from appellants' 
reconsideration appendix which were not individually numbered in the trial court record. 
-7-
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"I don't think its fair or appropriate that the Court utilize additional information essentially 
to meet the Court's basis for its ruling in a summary judgment, to now trv and a caic a iacutai 
dispi ite I" d : it i" t belie''1 • c: its appi opriate " [ I .R 6157] Mow ,: " ;"e i , tl it: presei ltatioi 1 of i n = '" v 
evidence is exacth the r , i r oosc of allow MIL a trial court to reconsider its rulings. 
Prior to .final judgment, "[a] court can. consider several 'factors in determining the 
propriety of reconsidering a pnoi ruling, fhesemax me...... a ^re not h r .u . . . 
tl le "it i" latter is presei itecl in i a ""( liffei ei it ligl it"1 :)i i n id* ;r < ill lei < n n c ;in :t u i isi ai ices; {2) there has 
been a change in the governing law; (3) a party offers new evidence; (4) 'manifest injustice' 
will result if the court docs not reconsider the prior ruling: (>) n court needs to correct its own 
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 l \2d U U u I J I 1 ( U a h App. \()"JA). 
Here, the new e\ idence was particularly appropriate because, " [development of the 
record i:> pariicuiai 1\ • warranted where lower courts have appi:.^. .u: • : u e : ' H! . • • 
!;!••! ?;| • -••• l~- -• -• - ( ) p p ' :>!: ti ii lit y to ' \ ; • * n.. l eco iu with an e \ e toward 
the ne \ \ I \ art iculated rule,"* l\irk w Stanford, 2011 1 T I ' II If 3 3 ; P.3< i Ii I this 
instance, appel lants produced e\ idence to satisfy the tri; i v^un . i-unug that appviiau.- ;LI,I 
to rely specific :ally :.".")! i. II I K i athei thai I tl i.e appai ei it ai it! i : ">t It; ;" c ».!.' .1. I. f'KAs agent; ; I "1 leretbre, 
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to consider appellants" evidence merely" 
because it raised questions of fact. 
I lowevei , even Ait IK >nt i ecoi isidci atioi i I ""lit Bi it < lickproc !i ivec 1 si ifficientc1 idei icel le 
-8-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
relied on Campbell/Five Star's appearance of authority and HTK to invest in BHDC. The 
trial court ruled, "Mr. Burdick presented no evidence that he invested in BHDC because of 
HTK's involvement or because he made any assumption about HTK's involvement." 
[TR5006] In so ruling, the trial court failed to view the facts and inferences in the light most 
favorable to Mr. Burdick. USA Power, LLC v. Pacificorp, 2010 UT 31, f 28; 235 P.3d 749. 
Appellants produced evidence Campbell approached Mr. Burdick in 2001 knowing 
of his recent retirement. [TR4384] Mr. Burdick knew he needed to invest his retirement and 
"just didn't want to give it to somebody off the street." [TR2148] Campbell told Mr. Burdick 
he was a professional financial adviser affiliated with HTK. [TR2148; 2150] Campbell told 
Mr. Burdick that HTK could help him invest with its assets, tools, and personnel. [TR2145; 
6766-lAM] HTK would be "hands on" to watch Mr. Burdick's investments, and move the 
investments when favorable to avoid a loss. [TR<5766- 148e] Campbell told him, "[HTK] can 
do a lot better than just letting it set there in one thing all the time." Id. 
HTK recommended Mr. Burdick roll over his IRA to a Penn Mutual Variable 
Annuity. [TR4703-06; 2153] Campbell and Alger were listed on the application as Mr. 
Burdick's HTK agents, which was reviewed and approved by HTK. [TR 4705] Mr. Burdick 
filled out HTK's Variable Annuity Client Suitability Questionnaire which was also reviewed 
and approved by HTK. [TR4705] Statements were then sent to Mr. Burdick identifying HTK 
as his broker-dealer. [TR6766-666] As a result, Mr. Burdick understood when he rolled over 
his IRA that he and his retirement were now affiliated with HTK. [TR2148] Mr. Burdick 
-9-
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further understood IITK licensed Campbell. [TR4390] 
Through 2001 -2002, while Mr. Burdick held the Penn Mutual Variable Annuity, HTK 
L- </ uin it would In *o "locate investment . opporlmniK- AI;LK :n. intercM MIL M eh im 
woi lid be more to [ 1; lis] lil ;:ii lg v [' I 'R 6766 154c; 2209] Sc )i i leth i le ii i tt le begii n ling oi 2003 
Campbell called him and said he had found an in\ cslmcut -A nh a better return. [ FR2209] The 
investment was BHDC. 
Tl ie Restate:! i lei it (' 1 1 lird) of Agei icy explaii is, ''appai ei it ai itl 101 Ity is based :)i i a till lit d 
party's understanding of signals of all sorts concerning the actor with whom the third party 
interacts. . . ?! i*- i;-*u.i*h ; question fur ilu- irici * Tract whether a reasonable person w e., 
position of\- ;n;iM
 E arfv w o n ; , ; e v I K \ e ;;..it a n a^en? h a e :hv. ; i ; . i ! h i i " v : i h e - : • • a 
p . - * u . \ . r . -:,!! '••.:• < v l : i i . J • ..= : u - '. K •
 : M , • • T:I . bk 
to a manifestation of the principal." §2 .03 , cml. (d; i l a ,._ M: I Uirdick produced sufficient 
evidence of manifestations of authority traceable to HTK to create a question of fact, 
^ • It Bi it «: lick also f )i o< Ii iee< 1 si ifficiet it < r1 nx lei ice to i aise a q;t testi :>i I of fact v tl tetl ler 1 ie 
rel ied on this appearance of author i t \ < >r 111 k to inv est. B> the t ime Campbe l l contac ted Mr . 
Burd ick about B H D C he had been icrininated from H T K . But TITK had never informed Mr . 
h . K oji- • ... ., • eassionc* -e - ; • . i: '* J)'' 
2206] Indeed, when Campbell pitched BHDC to Mr. Burdick, e\ en thiiiii was the same as 
tl ie previous 15-20 times \b iv-idiek hac i dealt with Campbell at HTK's Five Star office. 
[I R4386; 21 78] ^t the II I K< i amplK. - • . • ,: k n.e\ ,, ,,i.. • y; '• • 
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over" the Penn Mutual annuity into BHDC to realize a better return. [TR2185; 6766A50c] 
This is precisely the type of service HTK had promised it could provide. 
Indeed, Mr. Burdick understood BHDC was just another investment option and, based 
on his signing up with HTK to invest his retirement, Mr. Burdick assumed Campbell was still 
affiliated with HTK and HTK was still involved. [TR4385; 6766A54f\ In fact, as stated by 
this Court, Mr. Burdick was entitled to assume HTK was still involved: "One who has dealt 
with an agent in a matter within the agent's authority has the right to assume, if not otherwise 
informed, that such authority continues." Montana Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. Utah Junk 
Co., 228 P. 201, 202 (Utah 1924); accordDraemel v. Rufenacht, Bromagen & Hertz, Inc., 
392 N.W.2d 759, 764 (Neb. 1986)(reversing summary judgment for commodities firm 
finding questions of fact existed regarding agent's apparent authority post-termination where 
firm did not notify customers of termination); E.A. Prince, 818 F.Supp. at 915 (finding 
question of fact based on customer's reasonable belief its agent continued to act within 
authority because never notified of termination). 
The trial court could and should have inferred in Mr. Burdick's favor that had HTK 
destroyed Campbell and Five Star's apparent authority, he would not have invested in 
BHDC. He wanted professional advice, and would not have invested in an unauthorized 
product with an unaffiliated agent. The trial court compounded this error with another by 
rejecting Mr. Burdick's declaration which made these inferences explicit. 
Here, a jury could determine HTK represented to Mr. Burdick it would research 
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investments for him and move his retirement from one product to another to reap the best 
returns. Mr. Burdick relied on HTK to advise him when and how to invest, and did so 
through Campbell/Five Star. The jury could find BHDC was presented to Mr. Burdick as 
simply another investment option. Viewing the inferences of such facts in Mr. Burdick's 
favor, the jury could find Mr. Burdick continued to rely on HTK's market research and 
advice to invest in BHDC because he was never told of Campbell's termination or reassigned 
to a new agent. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to raise a question of fact whether Mr. 
Burdick relied on HTK, or Five Star and Campbell's appearance of authority, when he 
invested in BHDC. 
Appellant Wylma Temples 
Appellants likewise produced sufficient evidence to raise a question of fact whether 
Mrs. Temples relied on HTK, or Five Star and Campbell's appearance of authority, when she 
invested in BHDC. Mrs. Temples went to HTK for investment advice concerning an 
inheritance. [TR4514; 6766-111] She met with Frank Wheeler at HTK's Five Star Financial 
office. [TR3437] Wheeler introduced her to Campbell. [TR4515] Campbell told her he was 
also an HTK representative. [TR4518] 
Campbell sold Mrs. Temples an HTK-approved Pacific Life Variable Annuity. 
[TR4659-60] Mrs. Temples completed an HTK Account Agreement listing her registered 
representatives as Campbell and Wheeler and also completed an HTK Variable Annuity 
Client Suitability Questionnaire, also signed by Campbell and Wheeler. [TR4661-63] Mrs. 
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Temples then received Quarterly Statements showing HTK as her broker-dealer at the Five 
Star address. [TR6766-667] Mrs. Temples concluded Campbell worked for HTK by way of 
Campbell's authorized statements, meetings, and paperwork. [TR4516] 
Mrs. Temples met with Campbell at the Five Star office approximately every quarter 
to review her investments. [TR3478] They would discuss her annuities, life insurance, and, 
beginning in the fall of 2002, BHDC. [TR6766-269&; 3471] Mrs. Temples continued to 
receive Quarterly Statements for her HTK-approved annuity listing HTK as her broker-dealer 
at HTK's Five Star address. [TR<57<5<5-668] HTK never informed Mrs. Temples of 
Campbell's resignation. Indeed, Mrs. Temples testified, "well, there had - ever been a 
change. He never told me he did anything different, so I assumed it was with Townsend and 
Hornor and Kent." [TR4521] In fact, after Campbell's termination, HTK simply continued 
to manage Mrs. Temples' Pacific Life annuity through Wheeler. [TR4664] 
In late 2002, Campbell discussed moving Mrs. Temples' annuity into BHDC. HTK 
knew Mrs. Temples was being pitched BHDC from its office because Mrs. Temples asked 
Wheeler what he thought about BHDC and he responded, "[i]t sounded like a good thing." 
[TR4517]4 Mrs. Temples' Quarterly Statements continued to list her broker-dealer as HTK 
with the address of HTK's Five Star Financial office. [TR4654] 
Around May, 2003, Campbell called and again recommended BHDC. [TR3481] Mrs. 
4
 Since "corporations act, and can act, only through and by their officers or agents 
designated by such officers," then, "[knowledge imparted to the [agents] is generally 
held to be knowledge of the corporation." Montana Reservoir, 228 P. at 202. 
-13-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Temples still had no reason to suspect Campbell had left HTK. She explained, "The door 
was never closed. The offices were right together. . . Jeff would go in to Frank's office. 
Frank would come into Jeffs. Mary would come in frequently. I mean, there's - it wasn't 
a closed-door situation." [TR4524] Thus, Mrs. Temples had no reason to believe BHDC was 
not an HTK-approved product or that Campbell was not an authorized HTK representative. 
In fact, under Utah law, she was entitled to assume the opposite. See Montana Reservoir, 
228 P. at 202. 
Mrs. Temples again asked Wheeler his opinion on investing in BHDC. Wheeler did 
not tell Mrs. Temples that Campbell had been terminated from HTK or that BHDC was not 
an HTK-approved product. [TR6766-112] Instead Wheeler told her, "it was a good deal and 
if he had any extra money he would invest in it too." [TR4517] This was important to Mrs. 
Temples, "I would have to say that [Wheeler's] opinions - 1 did take very seriously.. . that 
did weigh heavily with my decision." [TR3530] Wheeler's recommendation prompted Mrs. 
Temples to invest. She testified this was her "last holdup. I just wanted to hear what 
[Wheeler] had to say . . . I hold [Wheeler's] thoughts and recommendations in high regard." 
[TR4520; 3483] 
Mrs. Temples went to HTK's Five Star office on May 8, 2003 to sign paperwork to 
surrender her Pacific Life annuity. [TR4523; 3584] HTK representative Mary Alger had 
prepared the paperwork to surrender her annuity. [TR4523] Ms. Alger likewise had prepared 
the BHDC paperwork. Id. Pacific Life liquidated Mrs. Temples' annuity and sent the 
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Transaction Confirmation to HTK at its Five Star office. [TR4652] Based on the above, Mrs. 
Temples believed BHDC was authorized by HTK. [TR3473] 
The trial court erred by construing all the above evidence and inferences against Mrs. 
Temples. The court ruled, "[Mrs. Temples] assumed HTK authorized Mr. Campbell to invest 
in BHDC because he had never told her anything to the contrary," but, "[fjhere was no 
evidence that she would not have invested anyway and HTK, therefore, cannot be considered 
a cause of her investment." [TR5008] Yet, the jury could infer she was relying on HTK when 
Mrs. Temples said she relied on Campbell and Wheeler's investment advice, and assumed 
HTK was authorizing that advice. Indeed, appellants produced evidence that Mrs. Temples 
was asked when she first thought of HTK in connection with her investment in BHDC and 
responded, "probably when Jeff started talking about i t . . . I never disassociated them. They 
were always in the background. I considered them an employer . . . I knew that they were 
affiliated from the beginning. And I never stopped and said, 'Okay. This is them and this 
isn't them' or 'Here they come back in on this.' It was just an overall umbrella that they 
were there." [TR3537-38] 
The trial court should have inferred that when Mrs. Temples was relying on Wheeler's 
recommendation, if he had told her BHDC was not authorized, she would not have invested. 
The trial court should have inferred that when Mrs. Temples relied on Campbell/Five Star's 
apparent authority, she relied on HTK. These inferences were made explicit in her 
declaration. The court erred by ignoring and rejecting all evidence in Mrs. Temples' favor. 
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Appellants Michael and Teri Marquez 
The trial court dismissed the Marquezes' apparent authority claim finding they failed 
to produce evidence of manifestations of authority traceable to HTK which the Marquezes 
could believe authorized Campbell, Wheeler and Five Star to act on HTK's behalf.5 Again, 
contrary to its charge on summary judgment, the trial court viewed all facts and inferences 
against the Marquezes rather than in their favor. 
The trial court first ruled the Marquezes "failed to produce any evidence that they 
relied upon any affirmative action by HTK." [TR5013] The trial court erred because the 
required manifestation may be in the form of "written or spoken words or any other conduct 
of the principal." Restatement (Second) Agency § 27. Such conduct includes "signs, 
advertising, authorization of an agent to claim that he is authorized, or continuous 
employment of the agent." Restatement (Second) Agency § 8, cmt(b). For example, the 
Utah Court of Appeals found apparent authority where the principal allowed an agent to 
travel in a car bearing its insignia and supplied the documents for his sales transactions. 
Horrocksv. Westfalia Systemat, 892 P.2d 14,16(UtahApp. 1995) In Johnson v. Nationwide 
Gen. Ins. Co., the court found the principal manifested its agent's authority by allowing him 
to advertise his agency, authorizing him to sell securities and insurance to the public, and 
giving him sales materials and forms to facilitate those sales. 971 F.Supp. 725, 731 
(N.D.N. Y. 1997). 
5
 The trial court found evidence the Marquezes relied on HTK to invest. [TR5013] 
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The Marquezes produced sufficient evidence of similar manifestations traceable to 
HTK. For example, HTK entered into Registered Representative Contracts with Five Star's 
members: Campbell, Wheeler, Davis and Alger. HTK sent letters to these new 
representatives congratulating them on their registration with HTK. The letters stated, 
"Welcome to HTK!!! . . . This approval means that you can now solicit and effect securities 
transactions." [TR4682] Appellants produced evidence this authority included actual and 
implied authority to advise and recommend investments, sell securities, complete forms and 
applications, and oversee withdrawals, surrenders and distributions. [TR453 8-39] Appellants 
also produced evidence of Five Star's use of HTK Block Transfer forms, HTK Account 
Agreements, HTK Suitability Questionnaires, and HTK Transaction Checklists. [TR4765; 
4661-62; 4663; 4729] Appellants demonstrated HTK inspected and approved the Five Star 
office in Price; approved Five Star's yellow pages listing and office signs; and approved Five 
Star's business cards with the required legend, "Securities Offered Through Hornor, 
Townsend & Kent, Inc." [TR4540-41; 4748-64; 4544; 4379; 6766-581; 4808-09] 
Though licensed by HTK, the Five Star members marketed themselves as Five Star 
Financial. HTK knew of and approved of this arrangement, which was not unusual. 
[TR4748-64] For example, HTK's branch office in Salt Lake was marketed as Cambridge 
Financial, which was "nothing other than a dba for Penn Mutual and HTK." [TR4375] 
Likewise, HTK understood Five Star Financial "was a dba used in [its] insurance and 
securities-related business." [TR4376-77] The arrangement benefitted both parties. Five 
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Star and its members got the required broker-dealer affiliation and HTK got new customers 
through the members' networks and contacts. 
With HTK's authority, Frank Wheeler began meeting with the Marquezes to give 
them investment advice. [TR4574, 6766-705] Their first meeting took place at HTK's Five 
Star office. [TR4574] Wheeler gave them a Five Star Financial card identifying HTK as his 
broker-dealer. [TR4556; 3098-99]6 A jury could find these were manifestations of authority 
traceable to HTK. 
Secondly, the trial court ruled the Marquezes could not have reasonably relied on such 
manifestations. [TR5014] Yet, "questions of reasonableness necessarily pose questions of 
fact which should ordinarily be reserved for jury resolution." Nielsen v. Spencer, 2008 UT 
App 375, Tf 16; 196 P.3d 616. The trial court erred because the Marquezes produced 
sufficient evidence to raise a question of fact whether they had a good faith belief Five Star, 
Wheeler and Campbell were authorized by HTK. 
Specifically, Wheeler discussed authorized investments with the Marquezes such as 
Fidelity mutual funds. [TR4574; 4591 -93] Yet, without distinguishing the two, Wheeler also 
recommended BHDC as "another option" and even walked the Marquezes across the hall to 
6
 The trial court disregarded the business card by ruling the card "limited" HTK's 
manifestation of authority to the sale of mutual funds and variable contracts, and BHDC 
was neither. [TR5014] According to the trial court, an apparent agency claim would only 
be possible if HTK's business card listed "Promissory Note Scams." The evidence 
demonstrates, however, HTK discussed mutual funds with the Marquezes which were 
authorized by the card. 
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Campbell. [TR4494; 4498-99] Both Wheeler and Campbell told the Marquezes they were 
representatives of HTK. [TR4497]7 The Marquezes were never informed BHDC was not 
approved by HTK. [TR6766-706] Wheeler never told them BHDC was unregistered, 
unauthorized and unsuitable. [TR4557] Rather, Wheeler, their HTK representative, told 
them, "Boy, if I had the money, I would surely invest in it" and gave them a "Growth Chart" 
demonstrating how a $50,000 investment in BHDC would grow at 12% interest. [TR4487; 
4498; 4509-10; 4620-27] 
Based on all the above, Mr. Marquez testified he believed he was doing business with 
agents of HTK and that HTK and Five Star backed Wheeler and Campbell's advice, 
including their recommendation of BHDC. [TR3104; 6766-245a] Mrs. Marquez similarly 
testified, "we assumed with [Campbell] being in those offices, everybody doing this financial 
planning, all the stuff, that it was all affiliated together... We assumed [Campbell] was with 
Hornor, Townsend & Kent. I mean, everything we knew, all these guys are in the same 
office, the same - worked for the same company, did the same things, only they were all 
different agents." [TR4502; 3215] A jury could find the Marquezes' belief that they were 
doing business with HTK was reasonable based on: they went to HTK for financial advice; 
they were advised by HTK representatives who recommended both HTK and non-HTK 
products without distinguishing the two; those representatives recommended BHDC; and 
7
 Indeed, the Marquezes invested in BHDC while Campbell was still an HTK 
representative. See infra at 40. 
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their HTK representatives produced a "Growth Chart" regarding their BHDC investment. 
Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing the Marquezes' claim. 
Appellant Ella Dean Hunter 
The trial court dismissed Mrs. Hunter's apparent authority claim finding, "there is no 
evidence that Mrs. Hunter relied on any actions or manifestations of HTK regarding Mr. 
Campbell's alleged authority to sell investments in BHDC." [TR5010] The trial court erred 
because Mrs. Hunter produced evidence she relied on HTK, through it's agents, according 
to HTK's marketing strategy. 
Mrs. Hunter testified, "I always believed there was a financial company that 
[Campbell] worked for that would back up what he told me and the investments I made 
through him." [TR4813] This belief was traceable to HTK because HTK licensed Campbell 
and authorized him to conduct securities transactions. Mrs. Hunter became an HTK 
customer through HTK's Block Transfer of Campbell's clients from his former brokerage. 
[TR4394; 4765] Of course, HTK marketed itself in Price as Five Star Financial Group, not 
HTK. Thus, Mrs. Hunter testified she received a Five Star business card, saw "Five Star 
Financial Group" on the window of the office, and knew Jeff Campbell was with Five Star. 
[TR1917; 6766-20U, 201b] Mrs. Hunter invested in BHDC because of Campbell and Five 
Star's recommendation. [TR1915] 
The trial court construed this evidence against Mrs. Hunter to rule she could not have 
relied on HTK because she relied on Campbell/Five Star. [TR5010] This is not the law. The 
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Restatement (Third) of Agency states, "[i]f the agent occupies aposition customarily carrying 
authority to do specific types of acts on behalf of a principal, it is reasonable for the third 
party to believe that the agent possesses such authority even though the third party does not 
know the identity of the principal. The principal's identity is irrelevant to the reasonableness 
of a third party's belief that a principal has consented to be bound by the acts of a 
conventional type of agent." Id. at §2.03, cmt (f). 
Thus, it was irrelevant Mrs. Hunter could not identify HTK because "[corporations 
can only act through agents." Davis v. Payne & Day, Inc., 348 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1960). 
In Utah, "[a]ny act or omission of an agent of a corporation, in the performance of the duties 
or within the scope of the authority of the agent, is the act or omission of the corporation." 
MUJI 25.1. Viewing these facts and inferences in Mrs. Hunter's favor, a jury could find she 
reasonably relied on Campbell's appearance of authority acting on behalf of HTK, even 
though HTK was not identified. Therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing Mrs. Hunter's 
claim. 
Appellant Terry Jordan 
The trial court ruled HTK did not manifest any authority to Mr. Jordan because Mr. 
Jordan did not meet with Campbell until after his termination from HTK. [TR5012] As set 
forth above, HTK's establishment and advertising of Five Star Financial, and employment 
of Five Star's members were all manifestations of authority. The trial court erred by ruling 
these manifestations were made after Campbell's termination. Appellants also produced 
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evidence to the court that Campbell did not use his HTK card after his termination and that 
Campbell was "quite sure" his first meeting with Mr. Jordan took place before he resigned 
from HTK. [TR2844; 4926, 2814; 6766-l65a, 165b)] The trial court erred in ignoring this 
evidence which plainly contradicted its ruling. 
The court also erred in ruling Mr. Jordan's "sole knowledge of HTK came from the 
business card." [TR5011]8 Appellants produced evidence Campbell approached Mr. Jordan 
regarding investing his retirement, including moving Mr. Jordan's IRA to other investments 
under HTK management. [TR4425; 6766-165b, 165c)] Campbell gave Mr. Jordan his HTK 
-authorized business card. [TR4445; 6766-165a, 165b] Mr. Jordan went to HTK's office a 
few days later to discuss investments with Campbell and asked Campbell about his 
qualifications and certification to sell securities. [TR4455; 4450-52] Mr. Jordan testified 
they may have discussed that Campbell worked for and sold insurance through HTK which 
8
 Again, the trial court proposed to discredit any reliance on the business card by 
ruling HTK's involvement was limited on the face of the card to mutual funds and 
variable contracts, and the BHDC investment was neither. [TR5011] Yet, the evidence 
indicated Campbell approached Mr. Jordan regarding investment of his 401(k) which was 
in a 72t IRA. [TR2852] Investments in 401(k)s and IRAs were on Five Star's card but 
did not have an asterisk. [TR4563] Yet, HTK had authorized Five Star to advise 
customers regarding their retirement investments, including 401(k)s and IRAs, and they 
had authority to process liquidation, transfer, or roll over of such funds into other 
securities which were effected through HTK. So whatever the asterisk on the business 
card meant, the court erred in ruling HTK's involvement was limited to mutual funds and 
variable contracts. Indeed, the card alone was enough to avoid summary judgment. See 
Ince v. AMEVInvestors, Inc., 857 P.2d 165, 167 (Or.App. 1993) (finding a question of 
fact existed whether a customer could reasonably rely on a registered representative's 
business card as sufficient manifestation by the principal of authority). 
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was "his affiliate with the investment stuff he was doing." [TR4446] Thus, Mr. Jordan 
understood Campbell was an agent of HTK. [TR4466] 
Based on the above, a jury could find Mr. Jordan did not just rely on Campbell's card, 
but also relied on his meetings with Campbell, HTK's Five Star office, HTK's licensing of 
Campbell, and Campbell's authorized representation to Mr. Jordan that he was affiliated with 
HTK. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to raise a question of fact whether Mr. Jordan 
relied on Five Star's appearance of authority or on HTK to invest. 
In conclusion, NASD Notice 01-79 explained BHDC's promissory note scam was 
predicated on a customers' reliance on his or her registered representative. The registered 
representative could never reach such position of trust without being licensed by a broker-
dealer. The scam simply doesn't work without the broker-dealer's shroud of apparent 
authority. In Utah, "[bjasic agency law dictates that a principal is bound by the acts of an 
agent clothed with apparent authority." Horrocks, 892 P.2d at 15. As stated in Johnson, 
"when one has constituted and accredited another his agent to carry on a business, the 
authority of the agent to bind his principal continues even after the actual revocation, until 
notice of the revocation is given." 971 F.Supp. at 731. Thus, "if the principal does not take 
appropriate, affirmative steps to destroy the former agent's apparent authority and reasonable 
action to inform third parties, the principal may be held liable for an apparent agent's 
actions." Id. Accordingly, under Utah law, "[t]he loss that results from [the agent's] 
misconduct must be borne by the party who empowered [the agent] to commit the wrong." 
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Horrocks, 892 P.2d at 17. Thus, appellants respectfully ask their claims for HTK liability 
based on apparent authority be remanded for determination by a jury. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED HTK OWED NO 
DUTIES TO ITS CUSTOMERS AFTER CAMPBELL'S 
TERMINATION 
The trial court erred in ruling HTK owed no duties to its customers following 
Campbell's termination. All appellants appeal the trial court's ruling their negligent 
supervision claim was based on Campbell's relationship with HTK as either a registered 
representative or apparent agent. [TR5018] Appellants tried in vain to explain to the court 
(initially and again on reconsideration) that their claim was based on appellants' relationship 
with HTK and the duties HTK owed them directly as customers, regardless of Campbell. 
The trial court recognized appellants claimed a failure to supervise both "Mr. Campbell and 
HTK's clients" but still only ruled HTK had no duty to supervise Campbell post-termination, 
and did not rule on HTK's duties to its clients. [TR5018] This was the focus of appellants' 
reconsideration motion, but the trial court still refused to rule on the issue.9 The trial court 
9
 HTK argued on reconsideration the negligence claim was "new." Though the 
trial court did not adopt this argument as a basis for its ruling, the court seemed receptive 
at one point stating, ?Tm going to hold the parties to their pleadings as to where they were 
at, at that particular time and I tried to handle each one of the claims as they were pled, 
and go through each one of those claims. And I think the order does that." [TR6193] 
HTK's argument and the court's commentary contradict Casaday v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
2010 UT App 82 at j^ 12; 232 P.3d 1075 where the only consideration was defendant's 
notice of the claim. HTK had notice of appellants' negligence claim from their 
complaint, from their expert's report, and from their opposition to summary judgment. 
[TR808-811; 4228-4239;4248] The claim was thus raised in the pleadings under Rule 
15(b) and "tried" on summary judgment. Fisher v. Davidhizar, 2011 UT App 270, *f 12. 
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erred in dismissing appellants' negligence claims against HTK. 
The trial court had sufficient evidence of HTK's duties to its customers. HTK did not 
dispute a duty to: 1) provide full and fair disclosure; 2) observe high standards of 
professionalism; and 3) recommend suitable investments. [TR6766-555] According to HTK, 
these duties were intended "to ensure the [sic] that the clients' welfare is served and 
protected." Id. In addition, appellants submitted the expert report of Stuart A. Ober, a 
securities professional with thirty-five years of experience in the securities industry. 
[TR4247] Mr. Ober opined, "HTK failed in its duty to inform its customers of Mr. 
Campbell's termination and the sale of unregistered and unsuitable securities... The conduct 
of the Defendants was a violation of the rules and obligations of investment brokers and/or 
advisors as set forth by regulatory authorities and against the practices and procedures of the 
industry." [TR4248] Mr. Ober submitted a 108 page report detailing and supporting his 
opinions regarding HTK's duties to its customers.10 [TR4244-4350] 
Yet, by dismissing appellants' negligence claim, the trial court ruled HTK owed no 
duties to its customers. In Utah, "[a] court determines whether a duty exists by analyzing the 
10
 The trial court struck Mr. Ober's report finding it "focus[ed] on various industry 
standards, duties, and regulations that would apply once the authority of an agent to act on 
behalf of the principal has been established." [TR4899] The trial court abused its 
discretion to the extent its ruling could be argued to apply to appellants' negligence claim 
because, "[u]nder Utah law, expert testimony may be necessary to establish the standard 
of care required in cases dealing with the duties owed by a particular profession, 
especially where the average person has little understanding of the duties owed by the 
particular profession at issue." Posner v. Equity Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 2009 UT App 
347,1121; 222 P.3d 775. Mr. Ober's report satisfied this requirement. 
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legal relationship between the parties, the foreseeability of injury, the likelihood of injury, 
and other general policy considerations." Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc., 2009 UT 44, 
T( 19; 215 P.3d 152. These factors impose duties of care on broker-dealers to their customers 
which survive termination of their agents. 
Legal Relationship between the Parties 
Appellants were customers of HTK. Appellants Burdick, Temples and the Manuses 
all signed HTK Account Agreements and purchased HTK approved products. HTK block 
transferred the accounts of appellants Ella Dean Hunter, Jimmy Henrie and Robert 
Swinburne to HTK and collected commissions on their accounts. Appellants Marquez were 
HTK customers because they met with HTK representative Wheeler at HTK's office for the 
purpose of receiving investment advice. Likewise, appellant Terry Jordan was approached 
to invest his retirement through HTK and met with Campbell at HTK's Five Star office. 
Though Marquez and Jordan did not open HTK accounts, they were still customers. See e.g. 
Dolin v. Contemporary Fin. Solutions, Inc., 622 F.Supp.2d 1077, 1083 (D.Colo. 
2009)(fmding plaintiffs were customers of the broker-dealer based on their dealings with the 
registered representative whether or not they had opened a formal account); Washington 
Square Securities, Inc. v. Sowers, 218 F.Supp.2d 1108, 1117 (D.Minn. 2002) (finding 
customers of registered representative who sold unregistered securities were also customers 
of broker-dealer despite not opening accounts). Therefore, the relationship between the 
parties was one of broker and customer. 
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This customer relationship survived Campbell's termination. Jay Baker, HTK's 
Manager of Market Conduct and Compliance, testified Campbell's clients were not 
transferred to another broker-dealer "and were still customers of Hornor, Townsend & Kent." 
[TR4369-70] Therefore, though Campbell was terminated, appellants remained customers 
of HTK. 
Foreseeability of Injury 
Following Campbell's termination, it was foreseeable to HTK that appellants would 
be injured if HTK failed to comply with its duties of care. "Whether a harm was foreseeable 
in the context of determining duty depends on the general foreseeability of such harm, not 
whether the specific mechanism of harm could be foreseen." Normandeau, 2009 UT 44 at 
f20. Here, HTK was well aware of both the general harm and the specific scheme. 
First, it was foreseeable to HTK that its customers would continue to invest with 
Campbell if HTK did not inform them of his termination. As set forth in the Restatement, 
"if the principal has reason to know that an agent may have begun to deal with a third person, 
he ordinarily has reason to know that the third person is likely to continue to deal with the 
agent until he has information as to facts indicating that the agent's authority has terminated 
or otherwise has notice of the termination. The third person, on his part, is ordinarily 
reasonable in believing that he will be informed if conditions change." Restatement (Second) 
of Agency, § 129, comment (a). HTK's Registered Representative Contract acknowledged 
the importance of notifying customers of termination: "Representative shall immediately 
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notify all clients in writing that Representative is no longer associated with HTAK [sic], 
sending a copy of such notice to HTK." [TR4681]11 Yet, neither Campbell nor HTK ever 
did anything to notify customers of Campbell's termination. 
Second, it was foreseeable to HTK that Campbell was going to approach HTK 
customers about investing in his real estate scam. Campbell, prior to selling BHDC, told his 
HTK supervisors and fellow HTK agents he was going to sell promissory notes that were 
supposedly not securities because they were backed by real estate. [TR4408; 4409; 4415; 
4358] HTK had received information from the NASD in December, 2001 regarding 
fraudulent promissory note schemes such as the fund-raising efforts of BHDC.12 From the 
11
 Mr. Ober confirmed, "[i]t is an industry standard for a brokerage firm, such as 
HTK, to notify its customers when one of its agents is terminated or leaves for another 
firm." [TR4236] 
12
 HTK argued, and the trial court ruled, appellants could not rely on NASD 
Notice to Members 01-79 because they presented it to the court for the first time on 
reconsideration. [TR5906] The Court abused its discretion in making this ruling because 
reconsideration prior to final judgment can be for the very purpose of considering new 
evidence. It is only after final judgment that appellants would have been required to 
justify why the evidence was not brought forth earlier. Regardless, the court further 
abused its discretion by accepting HTK's assertion that Notice 01-79 was "new" in any 
respect because of appellants' persistent reliance on the Notice prior to reconsideration. 
For example: 
1) Appellants stated in their Statement of Facts in their Opposition to Summary 
Judgment: "In December, 2001, the NASD issued Notice to Members 01-79. This Notice 
plainly described the BHDC scam for HTK." Appellants then quoted from the Notice. 
[TR4201-02] HTK acknowledged the Notice in its Reply. [TR4951] 
2) Appellants further relied on the Notice in their brief. [TR4230-31] 
3) Appellants' expert, Stuart Ober, relied on the Notice and quoted extensively 
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Notice, HTK knew the schemes targeted "Series 6" representatives such as Campbell to sell 
promissory notes to their customers; the notes were promoted as short-term, prime-quality, 
risk-free investments with significant returns; and that the notes were securities, but that 
representatives often mistakenly concluded they were not securities. Furthermore, HTK 
knew the sale of unauthorized private securities was the most frequent violation at remote 
offices such as Five Star. [TR6766-653] HTK knew representatives like Campbell often sold 
these private securities "due to the belief or the advice of third parties that the product 
involved was not a security." [TR<5766-654] 
Here, HTK knew the BHDC notes were securities despite Campbell's assurances to 
the contrary. Yet, when Campbell told HTK he was going to sell BFIDC, it still accepted the 
surrender of his securities license. Thus, HTK knew Campbell was headed off to sell 
unregistered securities to its customers without a securities license., 
Despite this knowledge, HTK did not inform its customers that Campbell had resigned 
and was no longer authorized to give investment advice on behalf of HTK or to sell 
securities. [TR4381-82] Through its contract with Campbell, HTK was entitled to the 
from the Notice in his report. [TR4281-82] The court ruled appellants could rely on any 
factual background from Mr. Ober s report even if they had not included it in the original 
appendix because already in the report. [TR5000] 
4) Appellants discussed the Notice in oral argument telling the court again that the 
NASD had laid out the scam for HTK in its Notice 01-79. [TR6035-36; 6051] 
5) Appellants provided the Court a copy of the Notice for the Court's reference 
during oral argument on HTK's motion for summary judgment. [TR6035] 
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originals and copies of all client files which both parties agreed were HTK's property. 
[TR4681] HTK could have used the files to contact customers or reassign them to new 
representatives. Yet, HTK never asked for the files and never re-assigned its customers to 
new HTK representatives. [TR4407; 4701-01] 
HTK understood customers were likely to believe HTK approved of Campbell and 
BHDC if it failed to draw some kind of distinction between Campbell and HTK's remaining 
representatives. Under its contract, HTK could have required Campbell and Five Star to 
"immediately remove any signs . . . including telephone listings if possible, which may 
indicate an association with HTK." [TR4681] Yet, HTK did not make any changes to its 
Price office or tell its representatives to avoid BHDC. [TR4549-50; 4552-53] HTK did not 
inform its customers BHDC was not an HTK-authorized investment. [TR4382] It was thus 
foreseeable to HTK that its customers would believe BHDC was authorized. 
Likelihood of Injury 
Following Campbell's termination, HTK knew its customers would likely lose their 
investments if they were not warned BHDC was not a suitable investment. HTK sent out its 
own "Compliance Corner" newsletter in the wake oftheNASD's Notice to Members 01-79. 
[TR4807] It demonstrates HTK knew promissory note scams such as BHDC had cost 
investors more than $300 million. Id. HTK knew that in 2000 alone, 300 investors had lost 
more than $12 million, landing the promissory note scheme on the "Top 10 Investment 
Scams List Released by State Securities Regulators." [TR4807] Finally, HTK knew its 
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customers were particularly vulnerable to scams promising significant, safe returns during 
market downturns when customers worried about the volatility in their long-term, variable 
product investments. [TR6766-690] 
Indeed, in the weeks and months following Campbell's resignation, HTK knew its 
customers were being called in to invest in BHDC at HTK's Price office. [TR4436-37] As 
set forth above, HTK personnel participated in the BHDC sales by referring customers to 
Campbell, recommending BHDC to customers, preparing and maintaining BHDC paperwork 
and files, and even investing themselves. 
Thus, HTK knew its customers were being pitched an extremely risky investment 
contrary to their investment goals. As explained supra, Campbell told HTK what he intended 
to do and HTK knew his scheme fit precisely within the NASD's recent warning about 
promissory note scams. HTK knew BHDC's promise of safe, significant returns was 
unfounded. HTK acknowledged, "a customer who indicates that they are a conservative 
investor and expects a high return with a growth objective, should be advised that their 
objectives and expectations are not compatible with their risk tolerance." [TR6766-566] Yet 
HTK never advised its customers BHDC's high interest rate equated with high risk. 
HTK already had the means in place to warn customers of such risks. Similar to 
private placements, HTK customers at times expressed interest in over-the-counter stocks. 
In such instances HTK would send a form letter entitled "Customer Disclosure 
Acknowledgment for Speculative Low-Priced Securities." [TR6766-645] The letter simply 
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stated, "Hornor, Townsend & Kent does not recommend transactions in speculative low 
priced securities . . . Due to the speculative nature of these securities, Hornor, Townsend & 
Kent requests that you carefully consider the risks associated with transactions in these 
securities." Id. The customer then signed a statement that, "I understand the risks associated 
with this transaction, and I understand that I may lose all or part of my investment." Id. 
HTK did not send these letters to appellants. 
HTK also had procedures in place in the case of customers who wanted to invest in 
private placements such as BHDC, which HTK called "direct investments." HTK dictated 
that, "[d]ue to the illiquidity of most direct investments and their inherent risks, only 
predetermined suitable customers may be offered approved products." [TR6766-575] To 
determine the suitability of the customer, HTK had a "Direct Investment Suitability 
Questionnaire." [TR6766-639-642] HTK did not send Questionnaires to appellants. 
HTK also never informed its customers BHDC was being sold as an unregistered 
security. HTK knew BHDC was a security and knew Campbell had resigned his securities 
license. Yet, HTK said nothing to its customers. HTK never informed appellants it did not 
recommend nor approve of BHDC, or that BHDC was high risk. Yet, it allowed the sales 
to go forth from its Five Star office, manned by HTK representatives, who referred customers 
and recommended the sales. 
In a market where its top selling representative in Price wanted to sell sham 
promissory notes, and persuaded even fellow HTK registered representatives to invest, HTK 
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knew there was a likelihood its customers would be pitched the investment scam and would 
lose their investment as well. HTK had a duty to disclose to its customers that BHDC was 
an unregistered, unsuitable security. 
General Policy Considerations 
The securities laws were enacted "to protect unsophisticated investors from securities 
fraud." Bradford v. Moench, 809 F.Supp. 1473, 1487 (D.Utah 1992). The law requires 
securities, such as the BHDC promissory notes, to be registered. The purpose of prohibiting 
the sale of unregistered securities to persons incapable of evaluating and bearing the risks of 
such investments (i.e. non-accredited investors) is *cto protect unsophisticated and 
unknowledgeable investors who are not able to fend for themselves." Cook v. Bishop, 764 
P.2dl89, 190(Okla. 1988). 
One duty of broker-dealers is protecting unsophisticated investors. The SEC has 
recognized for decades "that the relation of a securities dealer to his clients is not that of an 
ordinary merchant to his customers. Even apart from the relationship of agency which may 
exist, the status of a dealer in relation to the uninformed client is one of special trust and 
confidence, approaching and perhaps even equaling that of a fiduciary." In the Matter of 
Alexander Smith, 22 SEC 13 (1946); quoting William J. StelmackCorp., 11 SEC 601 (1942). 
Thus, there exists a strong public policy that investors are supposed to be able to trust their 
broker-dealers to protect their interests and not be walked into a known fraud. 
In Steenblikv. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872 (Utah 1995), a widow defrauded of her savings 
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sued the financial planning company and partners involved. Defendant Lichfield claimed 
he was not personally involved in the transactions and thus owed no duty to Steenblik. This 
Court disagreed and found, "Lichfield clearly knew that Steenblik was being fraudulently 
enticed into making investments. He did nothing to warn her or prevent her savings from 
being consumed." Id. at 879. Similarly, in Prymak v. Contemporary Fin. Solutions, Inc., 
2007 WL 4250020, * 15 (D.Colo. 2007), the court ruled, "requiring a broker-dealer to take 
actions to protect its clients from being advised by a registered representative known to be 
involved in a scheme to defraud investors has virtually no practical consequences other than 
those that would flow from running a typical brokerage firm. It is fundamental to the success 
of any broker-dealer that it must protect its client-investors from known fraud." Thus, there 
is ample support for duties of full and fair disclosure, professionalism, and suitability. 
The duty of full and fair disclosure is intended to protect investors. Tcherepnin v. 
Knight, 389 U.S. 322, 336; 88 S.Ct. 548, 553 (1967). "The fundamental purpose [of 
securities laws] is to implement a policy of full and fair disclosure so that potential 
purchasers and sellers can make informed investment decisions." Davidson v. Belcor, Inc., 
933 F.3d 603, 606 (7th Cir. 1991). HTK stated the purpose of full and fair disclosure was to 
provide "the most complete and accurate information to a client to enable them to make an 
informed and wise decision as to investing their hard-earned resources to obtain their 
personal and financial goals." [TR6766-555] 
Regarding professionalism, "[i]t is not to be questioned that [broker-dealers], who 
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are licensed to render service as brokers, must be deemed to have and use specialized 
knowledge, experience and integrity in rendering that service." Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & 
Co., 646 P.2d 715,717 (Utah 1982). HTK acknowledged, "[m]any failure-to-supervise cases 
involve indicators of misconduct, or 'red flags,' that should immediately alert management 
to potential wrongdoing." [TR6766-659] In fact, the SEC has long required "those in 
authority exercise the utmost vigilance whenever even a remote indication of irregularity 
reaches their attention." Reynolds & Co., 39 S.E.C. 902, 916 (1960). 
Regarding suitability, the NASD has "Know Your Customer" rules to protect 
investors. "NASD rule [2310] requires broker/dealers to update customer account 
information in order to ensure that a recommended transaction is consistent with customer 
goals and desired risk levels." Vinogradova v. Suntrust Bank, Inc., 875 A.2d 222, 229 
(Md.App. 2005). According to HTK, "the client must understand the product and services 
they are purchasing, " including "the degree of risk." [TR6766-555] 
HTK owed its customers duties of full and fair disclosure, professionalism and 
suitability. "Legal duty . . . is the product of policy judgments applied to relationships." 
Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, \ 17; 143 P.3d 283. Here, unless the above 
duties survive termination of the agent, everyone is in on the promissory note scam except 
for the unwitting investor: 1) the NASD knows of the scam and sends a Notice to its 
members laying out the scam; 2) HTK receives the Notice and sends out a newsletter to its 
representatives laying out the scam; 3) the representatives decide to engage in the scam and 
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inform their supervisors of their plan and their supervisors say, "That's fine, just don't put 
our name on it when you sell it to our customers;" 4) HTK then turns its representative loose 
on its customers to invest in the scam without ever informing them the representative was 
terminated, that it does not authorize the sales or the product, and that its Five Star Financial 
Group office is now selling both authorized and unauthorized products. 
This is not the law. In White v. Consolidated Planning, Inc., 603 S.E.2d 147 
(N.C.App. 2004), the Whites sued the financial planning firm which had employed their son 
as an account executive. The firm had become aware of the son's misappropriation of funds 
and terminated him, but did not tell his customers. The firm did not notify the Whites of the 
termination, allowed their son to take their account files, and never reassigned the Whites to 
a new representative. This allowed the White's son to continue draining his parents' 
retirement accounts of $300,000. The court ruled these factors were sufficient for the Whites 
to proceed with a negligent supervision claim. Id. at 161; accord Hollow ay v. Howerdd, 536 
F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976)(fmding brokerage that knew of agent's sale of unauthorized products 
"had an affirmative obligation to prevent use of the prestige of its firm to defraud the 
investing public"). 
Likewise, in Prymak, a registered representative sold bogus promissory notes to 
customers after his termination, but the court found the broker-dealer had a duty to its 
customers to alert them of the fraud regardless of whether or not it still had control over the 
agent. 2007 WL 4250020 at *14-15; compare Dolin, 622 F.Supp.2d at 1083-84 (allowing 
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negligence claims to go forward against broker despite agent's termination). 
In Johnson, where Nationwide terminated its agent for suspected fraud, the court 
ruled, "[u]nder such circumstances, Nationwide should have taken positive steps to alert the 
public of the threat [the agent] posed. At a minimum, Nationwide should have initially 
notified all of [the agent's] clients that he was no longer permitted to sell any Nationwide 
products." 971 F.Supp. at 733; see also Badger v. Paulson Investment Co., Inc., 803 P.2d 
1178, 1185 (Ore. 1991)(upholding jury verdict for purchasers of unregistered securities 
against broker who failed to inform clients that sales were not approved and that agents were 
acting on their own behalf). 
Here, the relationship between the parties, the foreseeability of injury, the likelihood 
of injury, and public policy all support the imposition of a duty in this case from a broker to 
its customers, even after termination of their agent. In addition to the evidence and caselaw 
cited above appellants produced expert opinion that, "[w]ith these NASD notices regarding 
the 'significant number of fraudulent promissory note schemes,' and the need for firms to 
protect clients, and given the red flag that Mr. Campbell was going to be selling the Notes 
and still remain in the same office with other HTK representatives, with the same signs and 
phone number, secretary, etc., all these factors point to the culpability of the complete failure 
of HTK's compliance to reasonably prevent the sale of BHDC Notes to its clients." [TR423 8] 
This was sufficient to avoid summary judgment. Accordingly, appellants ask their negligent 
supervision claim be remanded for trial by jury. 
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III. THE PARTICIPATION OF HTK'S ACTUAL AND APPARENT 
AGENTS IN THE SALE OF BHDC CONSTITUTED MATERIAL AID 
IN THE SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITIES 
Under Utah's Securities Act, a broker-dealer who "materially aids in the sale" of 
unregistered securities is jointly and severally liable for damages. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-
22(4)(a). As discussed supra, HTK authorized Five Star Financial and its members to solicit 
and effect securities transactions on its behalf Customers were never notified of any change 
to this authority and thus relied on the continued appearance of authority to invest in BHDC. 
"A principal who puts a servant or other agent in a position which enables the agent while 
apparently acting within his authority to commit a fraud upon third persons, is subject to 
liability to such third person for the fraud." Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 261. It is 
irrelevant that the agent did so for his own benefit.13 Here, HTK materially aided Five Star 
and Campbell's sales of BHDC to appellants Burdick, Temples, Marquez, Hunter and Jordan 
by failing to destroy Campbell and Five Star's apparent authority. 
Moreover, beyond apparent authority, HTK directly participated in the sales to the 
Marquezes and Mrs. Temples. HTK, through Wheeler, met with the Marquezes at its Five 
Star office and discussed various investments. [TR4498-99] These discussions included 
13
 See Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 262 (Illustration 1: P, whose business is 
that of advising persons concerning investments, represents to T that A is his manager. 
At P's office, T seeks advice of A concerning investments. A, acting solely to promote 
an enterprise of which he is the owner, makes deceitful statements in regard to it, on the 
strength of which T invests and loses. P is subject to liability to T.) Accord Horrocks, 
892P.2datl7. 
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BHDC. Mrs. Marquez testified Wheeler said, "if we were interested, that he would introduce 
us to [Campbell] . . . he walked us across the hall and introduced us to [Campbell] and told 
him we were interested in his project that he had, his real estate deal." [TR4402; 4498-4500] 
Wheeler then gave the Marquezes a "Growth Chart" demonstrating how a $50,000 
investment in BHDC would grow at 12% interest. [TR4620-27] Wheeler further 
recommended BHDC to the Marquezes saying, "if I had the money, I would surely invest in 
it." [TR4498; 3130] Thus, HTK's agent told the Marquezes about the investment, referred 
them to Campbell, introduced them to Campbell in the same office, and arranged a meeting 
with Campbell regarding BHDC. 
The NASD included the following in its warning to HTK regarding promissory note 
schemes: "Associated persons are reminded that 'participation' in a securities transaction 
includes not only making the sale, but referring customers, introducing customers to the 
issuer, arranging and/or participating in meeting between customers and the issuer, or 
receiving a referral or finder's fee from the issuer." [TR<57<5<5-689] Wheeler's 
recommendation, introduction, and production of the "Growth Chart" at least raised a 
question of fact regarding HTK's material aid in the sale of BHDC to the Marquezes. 
Likewise, there is a question of fact whether HTK materially aided in the sale to Mrs. 
Temples. As previously set forth, Campbell discussed moving Mrs. Temples' annuity7 into 
BHDC. Mrs. Temples asked HTK's Wheeler what he thought about BHDC and he 
responded, "[i]t sounded like a good thing." [TR4517] Wheeler was co-agent on the annuity 
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with Campbell and HTK had authorized him to make recommendations regarding disposition 
of the annuity. Before investing in BHDC, Mrs. Temples again asked Wheeler his opinion. 
HTK, through Wheeler, did not tell Mrs. Temples that Campbell had been terminated from 
HTK or that BHDC was not an HTK-approved product. Instead HTK, through Wheeler, told 
her "it was a good deal and if he had any extra money he would invest in it too." [TR4517] 
A jury could find Wheeler's recommendations constituted material aid. Therefore, appellants 
ask for remand of this claim for a jury to determine whether HTK is jointly and severally 
liable with Five Star and Campbell for BHDC sales to these appellants. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING APPELLANTS9 
EVIDENCE OF CONTROL PERSON LIABILITY WHERE THE 
EVIDENCE CORRECTED AN INACCURATE RECORD 
Appellants Manus and Marquez appeal the trial court's rejection of their control 
person liability claim. Under Utah's Uniform Securities Act, "[e]very person who directly 
or indirectly controls a seller . . . liable under Subsection (1). . . are also liable jointly and 
severally." Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-22(4)(a). A broker-dealer, such as HTK, is considered 
a "control" person. Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1574 (9th Cir. 1990). 
On reconsideration, appellants presented new evidence HTK was subject to "Control 
Person" liability for BHDC sales to appellants Manus and Marquez. The evidence consisted 
of Campbell's CRD listing (Central Registration Depository maintained by FINRA) 
demonstrating that though Campbell tendered his resignation to HTK on October 17, 2002, 
HTK remained responsible for his supervision until November 18,2002. HTK's continuing 
supervision is mandated by Utah Code Ann, § 61-l-6(7)(a) which states a registered 
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representative's withdrawal does not become effective for 30 days. Here, Campbell's CRD 
showed his registration status with HTK was not terminated until November 18, 2002. 
[TR6766-677] Therefore, HTK was a "control" person at the time the Manuses and 
Marquezes invested in BHDC. 
This evidence contradicted HTK's earlier representation and affidavit stating, "On 
October 17, 2002, Campbell terminated his independent contractor relationship with HTK 
in order to become a fundraiser for BHDC." [TR2121] HTK even represented this 
information was supported by Campbell's CRD. [TR2122] In preparing for trial against 
Campbell, appellants discovered HTK had incorrectly represented Campbell's CRD and 
termination date. 
On reconsideration, the trial court rejected appellants' evidence as untimely pursuant 
to Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f). Because Rule 37 requires the evidence also be harmful, the court 
explained, "HTK will be prejudiced if [appellants] are allowed to submit new evidence and 
declarations, whereby HTK would be forced to address evidence and issues that were not 
timely submitted prior to the entry of [summary judgment]." [TR5906] The trial court 
abused its discretion in ruling HTK would be prejudiced by the new evidence. 
First, the trial court erred in finding evidence of Control Person liability would force 
HTK to address a new issue. The issue was not new to HTK as evidenced by HTK's arguing 
the issue in its initial Motion for Summary Judgment. [TR2135-36] Second, the trial court 
erred in finding HTK would be prejudiced by having to address new evidence. It should 
never be said that setting the record straight, and correcting a previous fiction, is prejudicial 
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to the party that created the fiction in the first place. Here, HTK submitted an affidavit that 
inaccurately stated Campbell's relationship with HTK terminated on October 17, 2002. 
[TR2121 -22] HTK could never be prejudiced by that inaccurate statement being corrected. 
In stark contrast to this case, in Brussow v. Webster, 2011 UT App 193, *[[4, the Court 
of Appeals upheld exclusion of an untimely designated witness under Rule 37(f) because 
appellee could not depose the new witness or meet his testimony and, thus, "impaired 
[appellee's] ability to defend against [appellant's] claims." InLippmannv. Coldw ell Banker 
Residential Brokerage Co., 2010 UT App 89, ]|5, the Court of Appeals upheld the exclusion 
of an untimely designated witness under Rule 37(f) because the appellee would have been 
prejudiced by the delay of trial. 
No such prejudice exists here. There was no trial date set, no witnesses to be deposed, 
no hardship to HTK. There was merely the correction of a fallacy perpetuated by HTK in 
the first place. There is no prejudice in a litigant having to face an accurate record. 
Therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing appellants' claims against HTK under a theory 
of control person liability. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REJECTING 
APPELLANTS' ATTORNEYS5 FEES WITHOUT EVALUATING THE 
FACTORS FOR AWARD OF CONTINGENT FEES 
The trial court abused its discretion in ruling appellants' failed to present evidence that 
their attorneys' fees, based on a contingency fee, were reasonable. All appellants were 
entitled to recover "reasonable attorneys' fees" under Utah's Uniform Securities Act. Utah 
-42-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Code Ann. §61-1-22(1 )(b). A l/3rd contingent fee can be awarded as a reasonable attorneys' 
fee. Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461 (Utah 1996). The only question for 
the trial court was the reasonableness of awarding a contingent fee. 
Appellants submitted a declaration of counsel complying with Utah R. Civ. P. 73 and 
demonstrating their agreement with counsel to pay a 33 1/3 % contingent fee. [TR803-5811] 
Appellants detailed work on the case totaling 1,426.5 hours over four years of litigation. Id. 
Fees for such work totaled $427,950 when multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Id. 
According to the judgment entered against Campbell totaling $2,941,563.41, payment of a 
contingent fee would amount to $980,423.08. 
The trial court abused its discretion when it analyzed the reasonableness of this 
amount as an hourly rate as opposed to a contingent fee. The court relied on Kealamakia, 
Inc. v. Kealamakia to determine reasonableness considering the legal work actually 
performed, whether the work was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter, 
the customary billing rates for such work, and circumstances which require consideration of 
additional factors. 2009 UT App 148, If 10; 213 P.3d 13. The court focused almost entirely 
on the second factor and consequently rejected appellants' fee request for failure to 
distinguish between hours spent on claims against Campbell versus claims against HTK. 
[TR6142-44]14 While such distinction is relevant in an hourly case, it carries little weight in 
14
 Despite the trial court's stated reasoning, the court even refused to award fees 
for those hours spent on the case solely against Campbell after HTK was dismissed. 
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a contingency case. The trial court should have considered the "additional factors" unique 
to contingent fee cases. 
For example, in In re Priceline. com, Inc. Securities Lit., 2007 WL 2115592, (D.Conn. 
2007), plaintiffs obtained an $80 million dollar settlement in a class action alleging 
PriceHne's federal securities violations. Counsel submitted evidence of their hours spent on 
the case and hourly rates amounting to 12.1 million dollars. The court, however, awarded 
counsel double that amount in their requested contingent fee of 30% (or 24 million dollars). 
In doing so, the court explained, "[t]he award of the percentage requested here will 
encourage enforcement of the securities laws and support attorneys' decisions to take these 
types of cases on a contingent fee basis. The fee fairly compensates competent counsel in 
a complex securities case and helps to perpetuate the availability of skilled counsel for future 
cases of this nature." Id, at * 5. Counsel's description of the hours spent on the case 
demonstrated the "magnitude and complexity of this case," the "more than six years of 
contentious discovery," and the "intricate issues regarding proof of liability and loss and 
complex accounting issues." Id. The court allowed the doubling of the hourly rate for such 
work in recognition of "the risks associated with contingent fee litigation, and the quality of 
representation here and the results obtained." Id. 
Here, despite having the same information before it, the trial court abused its 
discretion by not considering any of the work performed, the extent of the litigation, the 
complexity of the case, the risk of contingent fee litigation, the quality of counsel, or the 
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result obtained. [TR6117-23] Had the trial court properly considered these factors, the court 
could have found the fee request reasonable or it could have reduced the fee if it found the 
above factors did not warrant the requested fee. The trial court, however, abused it 
discretion by doing neither. Therefore, the issue of attorneys' fees must be remanded to the 
trial court for determination of the reasonableness of appellants' contingent fee. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THE RELEASE 
BETWEEN APPELLANT HOWELL AND PENN MUTUAL WAS 
CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS DESPITE LANGUAGE LIMITING 
THE RELEASE TO HOWELL'S INSURANCE POLICY 
Appellant Howell appeals the trial court's ruling that the Settlement Agreement and 
Release between Howell and Penn Mutual was clear and unambiguous as a matter of law. 
Under Pennsylvania law, a release is ambiguous "if the terms are reasonably or fairly 
susceptible of different constructions and are capable of being understood in more than one 
sense." Black v. Jamison, 913 A.2d 313, 318 (Pa.Commw.Ct. 2006). Such can be the case 
when there is "limiting language" that restricts the release to specific parties or claims. Penn 
Mutual's Release is ambiguous because it contained limiting language restricting the Release 
to claims arising out of the Penn Mutual Policy Number 8129818 but reserving Howell's 
claims regarding Howell's BHDC investment. 
The release is governed and construed according to the laws of Pennsylvania. 
[TR1257] Under Pennsylvania law, the "court must look to the terms of the release, both 
clear and ambiguous, and examine the document to determine the intent of the parties." 
Martin v. Donahue, 698 A.2d 614,616 (Pa.Super. 1997). Here, the Release's first numbered 
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paragraph states, "The parties to the Agreement desire to settle and compromise all disputes 
and claims between them arising from the sale of Penn Mutual Policy Number 8129818 
(cthe policy') by Jeffrey Campbell to Mr. Grant Howell." [TR1257] There is no mention of 
settling claims against Campbell generally and, though known to Penn Mutual, there is no 
mention of settling claims arising out of Howell's BHDC investment. 
The second numbered paragraph similarly focuses solely on Howell's insurance 
policy, stating, "In consideration of the mutual promises contained in this Agreement, and 
upon full execution and delivery of this Agreement, Penn Mutual agrees to pay to Mr. 
Howell cash surrender value of the policy prior to the lapse of the policy on June 28, 2004 
. . . It is further agreed that in consideration of the mutual promises contained in this 
Agreement, Mr. Grant Howell will have no further rights or obligations with respect to 
Policy Number 8129818." [TR1257] Again, the consideration for the Release does not 
mention general claims against Campbell nor Howell's claims arising out of his BHDC 
investment. 
The third numbered paragraph releases Penn Mutual and affiliates, but expressly says, 
"not including Mr. Jeffrey Campbell." Id. In this paragraph, Howell released his claims 
against Penn Mutual "arising from, or in any way related to his dealings with Campbell, 
including the solicitation, purchase, issuance or administration of Penn Mutual Policy 
Number 8129818." Id. Here, not only is the focus again placed on claims regarding Penn 
Mutual's insurance policy, but Howell expressly reserved his claims against Campbell, i.e. 
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his claims regarding his BHDC investment. 
The trial court ruled there was no ambiguity because, based on the content of the third 
paragraph, HTK was released from all claims as a subsidiary of Penn Mutual. [TR1483] A 
different construction is evident, however, when these three paragraphs of the Release are 
read as a whole. The first paragraph states that the Release is intended to settle disputes and 
claims arising from the sale of the Penn Mutual insurance policy. This is limiting language 
consistent with the consideration set forth in the second paragraph and Howell's reservation 
of claims against Campbell in the third paragraph. These paragraphs are capable of being 
understood to release Howell's claims arising out of the insurance policy, but reserving 
Howell's claims arising out of his BHDC investment. 
Reading the Release as reserving Howell's claims against HTK for the BHDC 
investment is consistent with Pennsylvania case law. For example, in Harrity v. Medical 
College of Penn. Hosp., 653 A.2d 5 (Pa.Super. 1994), a hotel guest fell and injured her wrist. 
In addition, the physician treating her improperly set her fracture causing permanent damage 
to the wrist. Plaintiff sued the hotel in federal court and later sued the doctor and hospital 
in state court. Plaintiff signed a Release settling her claims against the hotel and "any other 
person or corporation from all actions or claims arising out of an accident which occurred 
June 22, 1986 . . ." Id. at 7. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs claims against the doctor 
and hospital since they were "any other person or corporation." The Superior Court 
overturned the ruling, however, because the Release contained the limiting language "and 
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for which suit was brought in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania at Civil Action No. 88-4913." This limiting language rendered the Release 
only applicable to the hotel action. 
Likewise, in Martin v. Donahue, 698 A.2d 614 (Pa.Super. 1997), the plaintiff was 
injured in a work-place accident. The plaintiff sued the contractor that employed him for 
workers comp benefits and also sued the doctor who improperly treated his injuries. In 
settling with the contractor, plaintiff released "all other persons or entities" and agreed to "a 
complete bar to all claims on suits for injuries or damages . . . resulting . . . from said . . . 
medical treatment." The Superior Court again found this release did not exempt the doctor 
from suit because the release contained other language releasing only those entities liable for 
plaintiffs claims in the contractor suit. "This language limits the long arm of this release to 
the parties named in the particular lawsuit which arose from [plaintiffs] fall." Id. at 617. 
Finally, in Black, plaintiff sued the estate of the driver responsible for a tragic car 
accident as well as the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation ("DOT"). Plaintiff 
eventually signed a release with State Farm insurance - her own underinsured carrier. The 
plaintiff released "all other firms, corporations, associations, partnerships, affiliates, 
subsidiaries and entities whatsoever" for "all claims resulting or to result from an accident 
which occurred on or about May 15, 1999." 913 A.2d 316. Based on the release between 
the plaintiff and her insurer, DOT sought summary judgment claiming the release settled all 
claims arising from the accident. 
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The Black court determined the language from the release where the plaintiff released 
"all other . . . entities whatsoever" for "all claims resulting or to result from an accident 
which occurred on or about May 15, 1999" could not be read in isolation. In a subsequent 
paragraph, the release stated, "It is understood and agreed that this settlement is being offered 
as the available underinsured coverage under a policy issued by [State Farm]..." Id. at 321. 
The court ruled, "[t]he first paragraph of the Release certainly bears similarities to the general 
release . . . However, the third paragraph identifies the parties and states that the settlement 
was offered as the available underinsured coverage and conceivably limits the terms of the 
Release to State Farm." Id. (emphasis added). Due the discrepancy in the language, the 
court ruled, "it is so difficult to reconcile paragraph one and paragraph three of the Release 
that it was reasonably necessary to consider extrinsic evidence." Id. at 321-22. 
The same result must be reached in this case. Paragraph one of Penn Mutual's 
Release can conceivably be read as limiting language: limiting the Release to "all disputes 
and claims between them arising from the sale of Penn Mutual Policy Number 8129818." 
This places HTK's interpretation of paragraph three at odds with paragraph one, resulting 
in ambiguity. 
Therefore, Mr. Howell's claim must be remanded for determination by a jury. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, appellants seek the following relief: 
Appellants Burdick, Temples, Marquez, Hunter and Jordan seek remand of their 
apparent authority claims against HTK for determination by jury; 
All appellants seek remand of their negligent supervision claims against HTK for 
determination by jury; 
All appellants seek remand of their material aid claims against HTK for determination 
by jury; 
Appellants Manus and Marquez seek remand of their control person liability claims 
against HTK for determination by jury; 
All appellants seek remand of their requested attorneys' fees for proper calculation 
by the trial court; 
Appellant Howell seeks remand of his claims against HTK for determination by jury. 
DATED this ZvJ day if September, 2011. 
SILVESTER & CONROY, L.C. 
%£^ 
Fred R. Silvester 
Spencer Siebers 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the JjZ> day of September, 2011,1 caused to be to be mailed 
via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANTS to the following: 
John Harrington 
Sherilyn A. Olsen 
Holland & Hart 
60 E South Temple, Ste 2000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Hornor Townsend & Kent 
yMUj J(uswgxn_^ 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Order Granting Summary Judgment January 11,2008. 
2. Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment Regarding Grant Howell Release 
and Granting Second Motion for Summary Judgment as to Grant Howell June 16, 2009. 
3. Order Granting Summary Judgment as to Burdick, Henrie, Hunter, the Manuses, Jordan, The 
Marquezes, Temples, Thayn and Swinburne June 16, 2009. 
4. Order regarding Motion to Strike Expert Report of Stuart A. Ober as Used by Plaintiffs in 
Support of Their Memorandum in Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment June 16, 
2009. 
5. Judgment May 10,2011. 
6. Order Regarding (1) Plaintiffs' Motion for Entry of Judgment; (2) Defendant HTK's Motion 
to Strike Declarations and Appendix Exhibits Submitted with Motion for Reconsideration 
May 4, 2011. 
7. U.C.A. 1953 § 61-2-22. 
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Telephone: (801) 799-5800 ' • -
Facsimile: (801)799-5700 
Attorneys for Defendant Hornor, Townsend & Kent, Inc. 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SID HARVEY. CHARLENE JENSEN, 
SHARON JULIANO, DIXON PEACOCK, 
BLAKE JONES, EDWARD HICKMANS 
DONNA LEMMON, JIMMY V. HENRIE, 
GRANT B. HOWELL, TERRY L.-JORDAN, 
RiCHARDMAMJS, TERESA MANUS, 
MICHAEL MARQUEZ, TERIMARQUEZ, 
ROBERT L, SWINBURNE, WYLMA 
TEMPLES. J. FRANK BURDICK, LORALIE 
THAYN and ELLA DEAN HUNTER, 
Plaintiffs, 
WORLD GROUP FINANCIAL, JAMES C. 
KULOW, JR., HORNOR, TOWNSEND & 
.KENI-JENJCL, JRANKH ^HEELER, 
JEFFREY c. CAMPBELL, FIVE STAR 
FINANCIAL and DOES 1-10, 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT REGARDING GRANT 
HOWELL RELEASE 
Civil No. 060700588 
Judge Douglas B, Thomas 
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Defendant Homor, Townscnd & Kent, 1110,'$ (uHTKJ0 Motion for Summary Judgment as 
vo ±:c Sctilemenx Agreement and Release dated January 10,2005 and signed by Giant Howell 
("Motion") came before .the Court on December 11, 2007 at 1:30 p.m. Sherilyn A. Olsen and 
John P. Harrington of Holland & Hart LLP appeared representing HTK. Spencer C. Siebers of 
Silvester & Conroy, L.C. appeared representing Plaintiff Grant Howell ("Mr. Howell"). Other 
parties noted their-appearances on the record. 
Anerreviewmg the pleadings, considering the affidavits and evidence submitted by the 
parties, and hearing oral argument, the Court hereby ORDERS, DECREES, AND ADJUDGES 
as follows: 
1. The Settlement Agreement and Release dated January 10,2005 between Mr. 
Howell and Perm Mutual Life Insurance Company (the '"Release") is clear and unambiguous. As 
> v/hoiiy owned subsidiary of Perm Mutual Life Insurance Company, Mr. Howell released HTK 
md waived £ny claims against HTK in accordance with the Release, 
2. There are no genuine issues of material feet with respect to the Release and Mr. 
Howell's release of HTK. Therefore. HTK is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 
3. HTK?s Motion is granted. 
4. The deadline for the completion of fact discovery shall be Monday, February 11, 
2008= Although the Court has ruled that the Release is clear and unambiguous and has granted 
summary judgment to HTK, Mr. Howell shall be permitted to conduct discovery on the limited 
issue of whether the Release was procured by fraud or mutual mistake. 
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DATED this //_lay of _ C / W ^ 
7 
^ 20% 
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
Approved as to form: 
> 9 
***-
Spencer- C, Silvester 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SID HARVEY, CHARLENE JENSEN, 
SHARON JULIANO, DIXON PEACOCK, 
BLAKE JONES, EDWARD HICKMAN, 
DONNA LEMMON, JIMMY V. HENKIE, 
GRANT B. HOWELL. TERRY L. JORDAN, 
RICHARD MANUS, TERESA MANUS, 
MICHAEL MARQUEZ, TERI MARQUEZ, 
ROBERT D. SWINBURNE, WYLMA 
TEMPLES, J. FRANK BURDICK, LORALIE 
THAYN zv.d ELLA DEAN HUNTER, 
Plaintiffs, 
WORLD GROUP FINANCIAL, JAMES C. 
- KUfcOWr-JR—HORNORrT-OWNSEND--&~ 
KENT INC., FRANK C. WHEELER, 
JEFFREY C. CAMPBELL, FIVE STAR 
FINANCIAL and DOES 140. 
CAMPBELL CASE 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
REGARDING GRANT JHOWELL. 
RELEASE AND GRANTING 
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AS TO GRANT 
HOWELL 
Civil No. 060700588 • 
Judge Douglas B. Thomas 
Defendants. 
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On January 11,2008, this Court entered an Order (the "First Summary Judgment 
Order") granting defendant Homor, Townsend & Kent, Ino.'s ("HTK") Motion for Summary 
Judgment Regarding Grant How.eli Release (the "First Summary Judgment Motion"). In-the 
First Summary Judgment Older, the Court held that in the Settlement Agreement and Release 
oaoed January 10, 2005 (the "Release5'). Mr. Howell clearly and unambiguously released Penn 
Mutual Life Insurance Company and its wholly-owned subsidiaries, including HTK, from the • 
claims asserted in this case. The First Summary Judgment Order also allowed Mr. Howell to 
conduct additional discovery on the limited issue of whether the Release was prociired'by fraud 
or nrutuai mistake. 
Following additional discovery, HTK Sled its Motion for Summary Judgment against-
Grain Ho well Thai Release Was Not Procured By Fraud or Mistake ("Second Summary 
Judgment Motion55) and Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment—Grant 
Howell ("Motion to Set Aside77). The Second Summary Judgment Motion and the Motion to 
Sex Aside came before the Court on April 7> 2009. John P. Harrington and Sherilyn A. Olsen of 
Holland & Hart LLP appeared representing HTK. Spencer C. Siebers of Silvester & Conroy, 
L.C.j appeared representing Plaintiff Grant Howell Other parties noted their appearances on the 
After reviewing the pleadings, considering the affidavits and evidence submitted by the 
parties, and hearing oral argument, the Court hereby ORDERS, DECREES, AND- ADJUDGES 
as foliows; 
1. Li support of the Motion to Set Aside, Mr. Howell relies essentially on the same 
facxs and arguments that he raised in response to the First Summary Judgment Motion. Mr. 
2 
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Howell has not presented any facts that would affect or alter the basis for the First Summary 
Judgment Order. 
2, There is no evidence that Penn Mutual knew that Mr. Howell was laboring under 
a misapprehension when he signed the Release, 
3. "When Mr, Howell executed the Release, Penn Mutual did not know that he 
nrcendsd vz reserve Ms claims against HTK. 
4, At the tirae Mr, Howell signed the Release, he was represented by counsel he had 
retained to represent him in his claims regarding Beverly Hills Development Corporation 
("BHDC"). It would not have taken much investigation or research to find out whether HTK 
was involved in the BHDC transactions or whether HTK was a subsidiary of Perm Mutual. 
5. At the time Mr, Howell signed the Release, he believed HTK was somehow 
involved in the sale of invesunenis in BHDC. Had Mr. Howell intended to maintain and 
preserve Ms potential claims against HTK, his counsel could have done so, Mr. Howell's 
counsel could have excluded the entire BHDC claim from the Release ot listed HTK or all 
parties associated with the BHDC claims as parties excepted firom the Release. But counsel did 
not do so. Instead, the Release reserved only the claims against Jeff Campbell 
Remainder of Page Intentionally Left Blank 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I UA 11V, I J J (J J ^ ' ' .)\J i . UUJ 
6. There are-no genuine issues of material fact as to whether the Release was 
procored ivv fead or mistake. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside is denied, and HTK's 
Second Summary Judgment Motion is granted. 
^ 
DATED this J day of   „ &± ^2009. 
• SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTIUCT COURT 
Approved as to ioim: 
Silvester & Conroy, L.C. 
N / 
s^ec ^Silvester 
4SI7407 4.DOC 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SID "HARVEY, CHARLENE JENSEN, 
SHARON JULIANO, DIXON PEACOCK, 
BLAKE JONES, EDWARD HICKMAN, 
DONNA LBMMO'N, JIMMY V. HENRIE. 
GRANT B. HO WELL; TERRY L. JORDAN, 
RICHARD MANUS, TERESA MANUS, 
MICHAEL MARQUEZ. TERI MARQUEZ, 
ROBERT D. SWINBURNE, WYLMA 
TEMPLES, J: FRANK BURDICK, LORALIE 
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Plaintiffs, 
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WORLD GROUP FINANCIAL, JAMES C. 
KULOV, JR., HORNOR, TOWNSEND & 
_:i?BKT7-JKrcri~.BR.ANK-r.-WHT3RT>.F'R 
JEFFREY C. CAMPBELL, FIVE STAR 
FINANCIAL and DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
CAMPBELL CASE 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AS TO BURDICK, 
HENRIE, HUNTER, THE • 
MANUSES, JORDAN, THE... 
MARQUEZES, TEMPLES, THAYN, 
AND SWINBURNE 
Civil No. 060700588 
Judge Douglas B. Thomas-
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On April 7,2009, Defendant Homor, Townsend & Kent, Inc/s ("HTK") Motions-for 
Summary Judgment on the claims of Plaintiffs Frank Burdick, Jimmy Henrie, Ella Dean Hunter,' 
Pddhard as.d Teresa Manus, Terry L. Jordan, Michael and Teri Marquaz, Wyhna Temples, .. . 
Loxalic Thay»5 and Robert Swinburne (the 'Tlaintifls") came before the Court. Sherilyn A,. 
Oisen and John P. Harrington ox Holland & Hart LLP appeared representing HTK Spencer C. 
Siehers of Silvester & Conroy, L.C., appeared representing the Plaintiffs. Other 'parties noted 
their appearances on the record 
After reviewing the pleadings., considering the affidavits and evidence submitted by the 
paries, s&d hearing oral argument, the Court hereby ORDERS, DECREES, AND ADJUDGES • 
as follows: 
L The parties haye completed factual discovery. 
2< Based upon the stipulation of the parties, Plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action • . 
(Employment of Unlicensed Agents) and Eighth Cause of Action (Breach of Fiduciary Duty) are 
disroissed v/ith prejudice. . . . 
3. By prior stipulation and Order dated January 11, 2008, the Ninth Cause of Action 
(Civil Conspiracy) was dismissed with prejudice against HTK. 
4. By prior stipulation and Order dated March 10.2008, the Fifth (Fraud), and Sixth 
Causes of Action (Fraudulent Concealment) were dismissed with prejudice against HTK, 
5. The only remaining causes of action to be determined by the Court as to HTK are 
the "Sizu Security Claims" (First Cause of Action, Second Cause of Action, and Third Cause, 
of Action), the £vNeglige£i Misrepresentation Claim" (Seventh Cause of Action), and the 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ttiriil'&Wm 1V:JH r'M UHl^A & TUt&fclfcUN FAX No, 43b Mb , l ] ^ f. UUb 
"Failure to Supervise Claim'' (Eleventh Cause of Action) (referred to collectively as .the.'. _ • 
""Remaining Causes of Action")- ", 
6. HTK seeks summary judgment as to the Remaining Causes of Action. 
7. A party is entitled to summary judgment upon a showing that there are no genuine 
issues of material feet. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c), The very "purpose of summary judgment is to. 
avoid unnecessary trial by allowing the parties to pierce the pleadings to determine, whether .there 
is £ genuine issue to present to the fact finder." Reagan Outdoor Advar., Inc. v. Lundgr.en, 692 
Pv2d 776, 779 (Utah 19&4). "In accordance with this purpose, specific facts are required to-show 
whemer mere is a genuine issue for trial7J Id. Conclusory statements that contam only 
imsubs^:iaied beliefs axe insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Brown v\ Wanlass3-l%. 
P,3d 1137,1139 (UtCtApp. 2001). 
8. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that there are no genuine 
issues of material fact'and HTK is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Remaining 
Causes of Action. 
9. In reaching these conclusions, the Court has not made factual findings; -it has 
made only leg*l rultogs based upon the undisputed evidence presented by the parties. In 
summary, the Plaintiffs have failed to produce sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether Mr. Campbell acted with the apparent authority of HTK w£en¥e~sofd 
Pkinxiifs investments in Beverly Hills Development Corporation ("BHDC"). The Court 
i,adresses each cf the Remaining Claims below. 
3 
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STATE SECF«JTY CLAIMS AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION'CLAiM , 
10. In their pleadings. Plaintiffs appear to assert that HTK is liable on the State "• 
Security Claims and the'Negligent Misrepresentation Claim because Mr. Campbell sold BHDC 
to Plaintiffs under the actual and/or apparent authority of HTK. •• -
1L At the hearing, the parties stipulated that Mr. Campbell did not solicit investments 
in BHDC -with the actual authority of HTK. 
12. Thus, to pursue their State Security Claims and Negligent Misrepresentation 
Claim against HTK, Plaintiffs must show that Campbell acted with HTK's apparent authority 
when he solicited investments in BHDC from Plaintiffs. 
i3. In order to show apparent authority in Utah, the following must be established: • 
(I) tiisithe principal has manifested his [or her] consent to the 
exercise of such authority or has knowingly permitted the agent to 
assume the exercise of such authority; (2) that the third person 
knew of the facts and. acting in good faith, had reason to believe, 
and did actually believe, that the agent possessed such authority; 
and (3) that the third person, relyiftg on such appearance of 
authority, has changed his [or her] position and will be injured or . • 
suffer loss if the act done or transaction executed by the agent does • • 
not bind the principal. 
saaain? 
P9S6YI 
:,n v. Eo&nvest Ltd, 855 P.2d 204, 209 (Utah 1993) (quoting Am.Jvx.2d Agency §.80 ' 
14. In .addition, when a third party deals exclusively with an alleged agent and 
relieves that the agent is acting with the principal's authority, the third party has an affirmative-
iuty to ascertain the scope of that agent's alleged authority. See Workers' Compensation Fund 
, .?%&£,- Corv., _ P . 3 d _ , 2009 WL 748825, 626 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 2009); Zions' 
Fin: fori hank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Utah 1988). 
4 
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"i 5. The Plaintiffs can be separated into two categories— the Category One Plafottffe 
and *ihe Category Two Plaintiffs. 
16. The Category One Plaintiffs are the Plaintiffs who purchased HTK-approyed 
produces through Mr, Campbell while he was an authorized representative of HTK The 
Category One Plaintiffs are Mr. Burdicjk, Mr. and Mrs. Manus, and Mrs. Temples. 
17. The Category Two Plaintiffs are the Plaintiffs who purchased products- from Mr* ' 
Campbell while he ,was not an authorized representative of HTK. The Category Two Plaintiffs 
are Mr. Henrie, Mrs. Hunter, Mr. Jordan, Mr. and Mrs, Marquez, Mr. Swinbume> and Mrs. • 
Thavn. 
IS. Asto the Category One Plaintiffs, the primary issue is whether these Plaintiffs can. 
^ t a b h a the third element of apparent authority, namely, whether these Plaintiffs have.shown a 
genuine ksuc of material fact as to whether they relied on the involvement of HTK when-they 
invested in BHDC. 
19. As' to the Category Two Plaintiffs, all three elements of apparent authority are at 
issue. More specifically, the question is whether the Category Two Plaintiffs have .shown, a. 
genuine issue of material fact a3 to whether: (1) HTK manifested its consent to the exercise of 
Mr. Campbell* s authority or knowingly permitted Mr. Campbell to assume the exercise of 
authority on HTKVbehalf; (2) Plaintiffs knew that HTK manifested its consent to exercise this 
authority, and acting in good faith, they had reason to believe and actually did believe tot Mr; 
Campbell possessed the authority to act on HTK's behalf; and (3) relying on this appearance of 
authority, Plaintiffs .changed their position and will be injured or suffer loss if the act done or 
t r a ^ ^ o n execined by Mr. Campbell does not bind HTK. 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
J W U.L,/ L U U W * : iv lL..~V I in W I I ^ • -• tt i U n U L - i W U I I I ' t tA i'H>, f J J U J U ' ^ 0 F. U I i 
20. HTK is entitled to summary judgment on all Plaintiffs' State Security Claims and 
Negligent Misrepresentation Claiifcs because all Plaintiffs failed to offer any evidence creating a 
genuine issue of material fact as to one or more elements of apparent authority. Mr.. and.Mrs. 
Marquez:'s State- Security Claims are also barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. 
Thereibre. HTK also is entitled to summary judgment on these claims on this ground. 
The Category One Plaintiffs 
(Burdick, Manixs, and Temples) 
A. Frsnk Burdick 
21. At no time did Mr. Burdick state that he invested in BHDC because of HTK: 
22. Mr, Burdick testified that he believed HTK was one of the Hivestin'ent resources 
to which Mr> Campbell had access; he thought HTK represented potential investors and with' 
some legal type of licensing: he understood Mr, Campbell was somehow affiliated with HTK, ' 
but that ht did XLOI understand what the affiliation was; and he assumed HTK was somehow 
involved in fee sale of BHDC because HTK had been involved with Mr. Campbell two years: ' • 
prior to investing in BHDC. 
23. Nonetheless, Mr. Burdick presented no evidence that he invested in- BHDC 
because of HTKJs involvement or because he made any assumption about HTK's involvement. 
- Therefore, he did not.show any genuine_issue_of material fact regarding whetheriiejelied.pnL
 r 
HTK?s alleged involvement Without such reliance, there is no causation. 
24. Because Mr. Burdick failed to present any genuine issue of material fact 
regarding his reliance on HTK's involvement with his BHDC investment, HTK is entitled to 
6 
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judgment as a matter of law on Mr. Brodick* s State Security Claims and his Negligent 
Misrepresentation Claim. 
B. Bich&rd & Teresa Manxes 
25. In her deposition, Ivors. Manus testified as follows: • , . 
Question: "When you were making your decision to invest in 
BHDC did you or—or your husband, to the best of your . • 
understanding, in any way rely on HTK as somehow being 
involved before you made your decision to invest in BHDC? 
Answer; No. 
T. Marms Depo. 109:19-24. This testimony establishes that Mr. and Mrs. Manus* did-not rely on 
HTK. ; • • 
26. Based on a business card, Mrs. Manns thought Mr. Campbell was as.sociatad with 
a reputable broker, But she cannot remember whether she obtained that knowledge in 2002 
'v t^-^ 2 she got the business card, or later, when she was gathering information for this litigation. 
She also testified thai she trusted Mr. Campbell because he was a friend. 
27. Mr. Manus testified that he was not sure whether he had first heard about HTK 
before or after he invested in BHDC. Mr. Manus testified that he assumed Mr. Campbell was • 
tied in with sn "outfiy' but that he did not know much about it. 
28. Mr.- and Mrs. Manus did not produce any evidence that they relied on any alleged 
Involvement of STK when they made their decision to invest in BHDC, Without reliance, .there 
is no causation as to HTK. Therefore, HTK is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Mr, and 
Mrs, Marcuses' State Security Claims and Negligent Misrepresentation Claim. 
7 
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C Wylina Temples 
29. Mis. Temples testified that she first became aware of HTK when she started doing 
business v i^th Mr, Campbell in 200L She recalls seeing the name "HTK7* on the building where 
Mn Campbell maintained an office, some financial documents she received, and a certificate she 
saw on the wall. 'She believes Mr. Campbell may have stated that he was a representative of:. 
HTK, although she does not recall any formal discussions regarding what HTK was. Mrs.. . 
Temples indicated that she assumed HTK authorized Mr, Campbell to invest in BHDC -because 
he had never told her anything to the contrary. However, Mrs. Temples also testified that she 
had no idea whether Mr. Campbell was authorized in any capacity to sell investments in BHDC. 
30. When Mrs. Temples was asked why she decided to invest in BHDC, -she testified 
that she (1) liked and trusted Campbell, (2) felt obligated to do something with the inheritance -. 
she received from her mother. (3) valued Mr. Wheeler's thoughts, and (4) wns influenced by Mr. 
Campbell's representations that there were many satisfied customers. 
i 1. At no time did Mrs. Temples testify that she- invested in BHDC because of HTK's 
alleged involvement. Tnere is no evidence that she would not have invested anyway and HTK, 
therefore, cannot be.considered a cause of her investment Because Mrs. Temples failed to offer 
EGV evidence to create a genuine issue of material regarding her reliance on HTK's alleged 
involvement in her investment in BHDC, HTK is entitled to judgment as a matter of law oh Mrs* -
Temples's Stare Security Claims and Negligent Misrepresentation Claim, 
8 
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The Category Two Plaintiffs \ \ 
(Henrie, Himier, Jordan, M&rqtiez, Swinburne, Thayn) *• 
A. Jimmy Henrie . *. 
32. Before Mr. Campbell became affiliated -with HTK, Mr. Heirrie began investing 
with Mr. Campbell in 199-8. • ' 
3 3. Mr, Campbell sold no new investment products to Mr. Henrie while Mr. 
Campbell was affiliated with HTK. " • : 
34. Mr: Henrie decided to invest in BHDC because it "looked good7' based on the§% 
repr^-nistbns of Mr. Campbell, which included references to "big money, big'houses;'and 
35 * Mr. Henrie could not recall whether Mr. Campbell represented -anything about 
HTE/s involvement with BHDC, had no recollection of HTK, and did not really knowwhat 
HTK. was. In fact, Mr. Henrie did not recall hearing, about HTK before his deposition in this 
case, and at bis .deposition. Mr. Henrie testified that he did not know what HTK did. . 
35. Mr; Henrie failed to establish any genuine issue of material fact as to whether (1) 
HTK manifested its consent to Mr. Campbell exercising authority on HTK's behalf or that HTK 
knowingly pexmitted Campbell xo assume the exercise of such authority on HTK's behalf; (2) he, 
knowing thc.facts. and..^tiagin^CLO<t feife,. had reason to. believe and. did ^ actually believe, that 
Mr. Campbell possessed such authority; or (3) he. relying otx the appearance of Mr. 'Campbell's 
airhority -<:• aci 03 behalf of HTK, changed his position. . ' • • • 
9 
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37, Because Mr. Henrie failed to establish any genuine issue of material fact as to any 
of the demerits of apparent authority, HTK is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Mr, 
Eennc's Si*te Security Claims and Negligent Misrepresentation Claim, 
E- SHa Dea^i Hunter 
3§. • Mrs/ Hunter testified that she did not learn of HTK until after this litigation . . 
conrmenced/and'even then she believed HTK was an "attorney firm." 
39. In her declaration, Mrs, Hunter stated that she never believed that Mr. Campbell" 
worked alone, and she always believed that he worked for a financial company that would back • 
up what he lord her and.the investments that she made through him. 
40. However, there is no evidence that Mrs, Hunter relied on any actions or •• 
manifestations- of HTK regarding Mr. Campbell's alleged authority to sell investments ih'BHDC. 
And there is no evidence before the Court that she relied on the manifestations of HTK in 
•risking her decision to invest in BHDC. ' ' .' 
41, Mrs. Hunter testified that when Mr. Campbell recommended the Pacific Life 
investment to her, she thought that his advice was backed by the company he worked for, but .she 
does not know what company that was. 
42, Mrs. Hunter failed to establish that (1) HTK manifested its consent to Mr. 
Campbell exercising VaSonty^on HTITS b l S 2 f o r ^ ' 
to a-3-sume- the exercise of such authority on HTK's behalf: (2) she, knowing the facts, and acting 
ki sood -aith, had reason to believe and did actually believe, that Mr, Campbell possessed such ' 
authority: and (3) she, relying on the appearance of Mr. Campbell's authority to act on behalf of 
HTK, changed her position. 
10 
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43, Because Mrs. Hunter failed to establish any genuine issues of material fact 'as tp *' 
any of the elements of apparent authority, HTK is entitled to judgment as a matter of lav/ pn'Mrs. 
Hunter's State Security Claims and Negligent Misrepresentation Claim. 
C .Terry Jordan . • . 
44 . Mr. Jordan testified that he thought he was a client of HTK because at some point 
in time. Mr. Jordan received a business card from Mr, Campbell The card stated, "Securities
 t 
Offered Through Homor> Townsend & Kent, Inc. •. •" as a footnote to the term's "mutual funds'3 •• 
and 'Variable contracts," From the way Mr. Campbell represented himself with the-business 
card, Mr. Jordan understood it described his qualifications to make investments. ' . ' • * 
45. j> ir. Jordan testified that he first recalled learning aboirt HTK from the business • 
card, max his sole knowledge of HTK came from the business card, and he did not taqow- what • 
HTKdid. 
46. When Mr. Jordan was asked whether he understood that the investment in BHDC 
was being sold by HTK or by Five Star Financial Group, he answered, "I just figured it was . . -
b£ng sold by Five Star Investment Group." 
47> Tne "business card is limiting on its face. It states that HTK's involvement applies 
only TO mutual funds and variable contracts. The Court finds that if someone is going to rely on 
a business card, that person must rely on what it says. In this case, the business card limit? Mr; 
Campbell's alleged -affiliation with HTK to mutual funds and variable contracts. The- BHDC ' • 
investment was neither a mutual fund nor a variable contract 
4S. In addition, there is no evidence before the Court that HTK was involved in- .• * 
presenting any of the BHDC investment information to Mr. Jordan. 
11 
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49. Mr; Jordan did not meet with Mr. Campbell until after Mr. Campbell, terminated 
his relationship 'With HTK. HTK made no manifestations or representations to Mr. Jordan 
whatsoever. Any representations to Mr. Jordan were made solely by Mr. Campbell-after he 
disassociated himself from HTK. Therefore, Mr. Jordan did not rely on any independent acts''of 
HTK, 
50. There is no evidence that Mr, Jordan relied on HTK in making his.investment in 
BHDC, Mr. Jordan cannox prove causation because he did not state that he invested in BHDC 
because of HTK. • 
51. Mr. Jordan failed to establish that (1) HTK manifested its consent to Mr. • ' • -
Campbell exercising authority on HTK's behalf or that HTK knowingly permitted Campbell to
 t 
ass;mie the exercise of such authority on HTK's behalf; (2) he knew of the facts and, acting in 
good faith, had reason TO believe, and did actually believe that Mr. Campbell possessed such 
authority; and (3.) he, relying on the appearance of Mr. Campbell's authority to act on behalf of 
HTK, changed his position. 
52. Because 'Mr. Jordan failed to establish any genuine issues of material fact-as to 
cm of the elements of apparent authority, HTK is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Mr. 
Jordan*s Sv^ tc Security Claims and Negligent Misrepresentation Claim. 
D. Mike ,& Ten Marquez 
53. Based upon a business card he saw, Mr. Marquez testified that, he -relied on the 
involvement of HTK when he invested in BHDC. Earlier in his deposition, however/ when 
asked what he relied upon when investing in BBDC, Mr. Marquez testified that he was relying 
on Mr. Whctlcf s and Mr. Campbell's representations that it was a good investment. 
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54. . With respect to the third element of apparent agency, i,e., reliance, the Court 
believes there .is likeiy a disputed issue of feet, • • • • 
55. However, with respect to the first element of apparent authority, /. el, that HTK .did' 
.something to manifest its consent or knowingly permitted Mr. Campbell to assume the exercise 
of such authority, the Court finds that Mr. and Mrs. Marquez failed to produce any-evidence that 
thsy relied upon any afnimative action by HTK. 
56. Mr. Marqiiez thought Mr. Campbell was an agent for a large corporation. Mrs. 
Marquee d&iaied that Mr, Campbell said that he was a representative of HTK when he' sold her 
fee investment in.BHDC. Later, Mrs; Marquez clarified that Mr. Campbell did not.tell.her.that/ •' 
HTK was Involved -in BHDC and that she assumed he was working with HTKL ..• •• • 
57. Mrs. Marquez testified that they decided to invest in BHDC because they.believed 
it was the option that would provide the best rate of return and that was the only reason why they 
invested. 
58. Mrs. Marquez said they assumed Mr. Campbell was with HTK and.that the" 
assumption came .from seeing the company name, but she could not recall where she saw it. ghe 
said she saw it sometime in Mr. "Wheeler's or Mr, Campbell's office. When asked whether she '
 t 
b d a specific recollection of where she saw HTK's name, she said, '1 don't know." 
59. Mr. Marquez recalls seeing Mir. Campbell's name and Five Star's' name on a 
business card. Mr. Marquez testified that he believed he was a client of HTK based on the 
alleged business card, but Mi, and Mrs. Marquez were "unable to produce the business cardi .• .'•' • 
13 
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60. Again, the business card is limiting on its face. The business card indicates that: 
HTK's alleged affiliation with Mr. Campbell is limited to mutual funds and variable contracts. • 
The BHDC investment was neither a mutual fund or a variable contract. • 
61. Mrs. Marquez also testified that she had received the business card. But'she was 
unable to say with' certainty that at the time she invested in BHDC, she had read HTK's name on 
the caid, Mr, and Mrs, Marquez testified that they did not research HTK until after they had . 
Rested in BHDC. • '• . *; ' 
62. It does-not appear thai HTK did anything upon which Mr. and Mxs.Marquez 
could reasonably rely. Mr. Campbell may have done something, but Mr. and Mrs. Marquez were 
not clients of Mr. Campbell when he was associated with HTK. The Marquezes had not 
purchased, any products that would put HTK on notice. Moreover, Mr. and Mrs. Marquqz did • 
£.ot do arty investigation of HTK until after they invested in BHDC. • " • ' • 
S3. Mr. and Mrs. Marquez failed to establish that (1) HTK manifested its consent to'" 
Mr. Campbell exercising authority on HTK's behalf or that HTK knowingly permitted Campbell 
to assume the exercise'of such authority on HTK's behalf; and (2) Mr. and Mrs. Marquez knew; 
the fac:s, and acting in good faith- had reason to believe and did actually believe that Mr: . . 
Campbell possessed such authority. In addition, Mr. and Mrs. Marquez failed to ascertain the 
scope of Mr. Campbell's alleged authority to act on behalf of HTK prior to investing, in BHDC, 
6^. Because Mr. and Mrs. Marquez failed to establish any genuine issue of material , 
fact as to the first two elements of apparent authority and failed to ascertain the scope of Mr. 
Campbell's alleged authority, -HTK is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Mr. and Mrs.
 4 
Marcra&z's State Security Claims and Negligent Misrepresentation Claim against HTKv 
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E. Sfebert'Swinb'ume _ , -^ 
65. Mr. Swinburne began investing with Mr. Campbell before Mr. Campbell was 
iifma^c vvith BIX and while Mr. Campbell was a registered representative of Washington . • 
• Square' Securities ("WSSv0. Mr. Swinburne did not realize that Mr, Campbell had changed'. 
affiliations from WSS to HTK until reviewing documents the night before his deposition in this 
66-. Mr, 'Swinburne did not know that HTK was allegedly involved in this case until- • 
-iir, nigbx before bis deposition in this case. 
61. Mr. Campbell sold no new investment products to Mr. Swinburne while Mr. 
Campbell was affiliated with HTKL 
68. When Mr. Swinburne depided to invest in BHDC, he did not have any '" . ' 
•unde^standiag as to whether HTK was involved with Mr. Campbell or BHDC, Mr. Swinburne-
^ y h£v-* had some general understanding that a company was behind Mr. Campbell but he did 
- not know what me company was, and he certainly did not rely on HTK when making his 
investment in BHD C, . 
69. Mr,, Swinburne failed to establish that (1) HTK manifested its consent to Mr-,- . ' • 
Campbell exercising authority on HTK's behalf or that HTK knowingly pennitted Campbell to 
assume the exercise of sueh authority on HTK's behalf; (2) he knew the facts and acting in good 
rai'ih, had reason to believe, and did actually believe, that Mr. Campbell possessed such 
auihori'ty: and (3) he, relying on the appearance of Mr. Campbell's authority to act on'behalf-of 
HT3L changed his position.. 
15 
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70. Because Mr, Swinburne failed to establish any genuine issue of material, fact-as to 
any of the elements of apparent authority, HTK is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Mr. 
•i*» JL> oralis Th&vi?ii 
71. Mrs, Thayn did not purchase any products from Mr. Campbell while he was 
affiliated with HTK. ' . < • 
72. Mrs, Thayn invested in BHDC because her husband asked her to do so. '••'"• 
73. • Mr* Thayn xelied only upon the representations of Mr. Jordan and Mr. Campbell 
whcii deciding ta invest m BHDC, Mr, Thayn did not have an understanding of whether -or not 
HTK was involved in BHDC. . . / . . • 
74. Mrs* Thayn first heard about HTK after she met with her attorney involved in.lhis 
litigation. 
75. Mrs. Thayn testified that she had no reason to believe that HTK was involved in 
BHDC or mat HTK made a misrepresentation to hert ' 
7c, Mrs, Thayn failed to establish thai (1) HTK manifested its consent to Mr." 
Campbell exercising authority on HTK's behalf or that HTK knowingly permitted Campbell to 
assume the exercise of such authority on HTKs behalf; (2) she knew the facts and, acting in 
good faith had reason to believe, and did actually believe, that Mr. Campbell possessed such.* 
authority; and (?) she-, relying on the appearance of Mr. Campbell's authority to act oil behalf-of 
HTK. obliged hex position. 
16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
n
m / m 12:46 FM CHIAPA & TORGERSON FAX No, 435 636 n138 P. 022 
77. Because Mrs. Thayn failed to establish any genuine issue of material fact as-to':- * 
any of the elements of apparent authority, HTK is entitled to judgment as a matter of law-on Mrs. 
Thayn's State Security Claims and Negligent Misrepresentation Claim. . 
St'ate Security Claims: Statute of Limitations ' 
(B^rdick. Jordan, Manus, and Marqtiez) 
78. KTK-properly pled the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense pursuant to . 
fee standards set form mBangerter v Petty, 2008 UT App 153, \ 18,184 P3d 1249v 1253'(Utah 
Ct App. 2008), cert granted, No. 20080562,2008 Utah Lexis 168, at *1 (Utah Sept, 17, 2008). 
79. More' specifically. HTK properly pled the statute of limitations because the' statute 
HTK relied upon is the same statute Plaintiffs relied upon in their Complaint. As such, the • 
Plaintiffs were on sufficient notice as to the statute on which HTK was relying in its .affirmative 
defense. :" ' •' '" 
80. Under Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-22(a)(7), the statute of limitations, on the-.'State .. • : 
Security Claims is two years "after the discovery by the plaintiff of the facts constituting-the:' • \ 
violation .:" • 
S L As xo plaintiffs Mr. B.urdick, Mr. Jordan, and Mr. and Mrs. Manus, there are 
genuine issues of fact regarding whether their State Security Claims axe barred by the statute of. 
82. As to. Mr. and Mrs. Marquez, the undisputed material facts establish that on- -....-. 
March 1,2004, Mr. and Mrs. Marquez learned directly from Mr. Campbell that BHDC's assets.. 
were frozen ana that Mr. Fitzergerald "had taken off with all of the money " At this time, 
Mr. and Mrs. Marquez had sufficient facts to put them on notice that they had a .cause of action • 
17 
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regarding the suitability .of their investment, the safety of their investment, or the existence of .• 
their investment, 
83. Mr, and Mrs. M'arquez did not file their State Security Claim uatil March 6>2006, 
Because this was more than two years after March 1, 2004, their State Security Claims are barred . 
bythcs^tatcofikaitatioixs. 
84. KTK is entitled io judgment as a matter of law on its defense that.Mr. and'Mrs. 
Maxquez's State Security Claims are barred by the statute of limitations. 
. ' FAILURE TO SUPERVISE CLAIM 
85 • Haintiffe also claim that HTK failed to properly supervise Mr. Campbell and- \ . 
KTJX? s ciicGis dining the sale of investments in BHDC- • • ' • ' . 
86, More specifically, Plaintiffs appear to contend that HTK's duty to supervise Mr, • 
Campbell arises from Mr. Campbell selling BHDC as either a registered representative of HTK 
or as its alleged agent, 
87, Plaintiffs' first theory fails as a matter of law because it is undisputed that Mr. . 
Campbell terminated his relationship as a registered representative with HTK on October 17, 
2002, n^d fear Mr. Campbell solicited investments -from the Plaintiffs in BHDC after this date. • " 
Because Mr. Campbell was not a registered representative of HTK at the time he sold BHDC, 
HTK owed no duty to supervise Mr. Campbell as its alleged registered representative, ' • 
88, Plaintiffs' second theory also fails as a matter of law. As stated above3dt is . 
undisputed that Mr. Campbell did not solicit investments in BHDC with the actual authority of . 
HTK. in addition and for the reasons set forth in detail above3 Plaintiffs have failed to establish a-
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Campbell solicited investments in BHDC with 
18 
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the apyarsEt samosrky of HXKL Because Mr. Campbell did not solicit investments irxBHDG 
with the actual or apparent authority of HTK, it had no duty to supervise him as its alleged agent. 
89. Fot these reasons, HTK is entitled to judgment 25 a matter of law dismissing the '• 
Plaintiffs' Failure'to Supervise Claim. 
ID this /"> 
f2L, 
day of .^fisLCt-* ^ 2009. 
Silvester &CG3roy,L.C. 
O 0/7 
„ - ^ * ^ 
Spencert. Silvester 
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SID HARVEY, CHARLENE JENSEN, 
SHARON JULIANO, DIXON PEACOCK, 
BLAKE JONES, EDWARD HICKMAN, 
DONNA LEMMON, JIMMY V. HENRIE, 
GRANT B. HOWELL, TERRY L. JORDAN, 
RICHARD MANUS, TERESA MANUS, 
MICHAEL MARQUEZ, TERI MARQUEZ, 
ROBERT D. SWINBURNE, WYLMA 
TEMPLES, J. FRANK BURDICK, LORALIE 
THAYN and ELLA DEAN HUNTER, 
Plaintiffs. 
v. 
WORLD GROUP FINANCIAL, JAMES C. 
KULOW, JR., HORNOR, TOWNSEND & 
KENT INC., FRANK C. WHEELER, 
JEFFREY C. CAMPBELL, FIVE STAR 
FINANCIAL and DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
CAMPBELL CASE 
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STRIKE EXPERT REPORT OF 
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THEIR MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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Defendant Hornor, Townsend & Kent, Inc 's ("HTK'5) Motion To Strike Expert 
Testimony of Stuart Ober as used by Plaintiffs in Support of Their Memorandum in Opposition 
to Motions for Summary Judgment ("Motion to Strike") came before the Court on April 7, 
2009. John P. Harrington and Sheriiyn A. Olsen of Holland & Hart LLP appeared representing 
HTJL Spencer C. Siebers of Silvester & Conroy, L.C., appeared representing Plaintiffs. Other 
parties noted their appearances on the record. 
After reviewing the pleadings, considering the affidavits and evidence submitted by the 
parties, and hearing oral argument, the Court hereby ORDERS, DECREES, AND ADJUDGES 
as follows: 
1. By stipulation of the parties, HTK has reserved its right to file a subsequent 
Motion in Limine, seeking to exclude the admission into evidence of Mr. Ober's testimony 
and/or expert report at a trial in this case. 
2. HTK's motions for summary judgment primarily raise the issues of vicarious 
liability, actual authority, and apparent authority; that is. whether Mr. Campbell had actual, or 
apparent authority7 to act on behalf of HTK. 
3. Mr. Ober s reoort focuses on various industry standards, duties, and regulations 
that would apply once the authority of an agent to act on behalf of the principal has been 
established. 
4. The first several pages of factual background in Mr. Ober's report are based 
solely upon the allegations in the Plaintiffs' Complaint, not on deposition testimony. 
5. Mr. Ober's report does not contain any facts regarding apparent authority that 
were not otherwise available to the parties or the Court. 
2 
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6. In ruling on 'HTK's motions for summary judgment, the Court will not consider 
Mr. Obefs legal opinions, including his opinions concerning whether the facts support a finding 
that Mr, 'Campbell acted with apparent authority5. 
7. In his report Mr. Ober may have relied oii facts, deposition testimony, or other 
evidence in the record. And in their memorandum in opposition to the motions for summary-
judgment. Plaintiffs may have cited to Mr. Ober's report as support for certain facts, rather than 
citing to deposition transcripts or other evidence. To the extent that this occurred. Plaintiffs may 
continue to rely on Mr. Obefs report for facts or evidence that are in his report and not otherwise 
included in. Plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition to summary judgment or supporting materials. 
DATED this / 5 day of ~ T w i € L . 2009. 
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
Approved as to form: 
Silvester & Conroy, L.C. 
Judge Don'glas B. Thomas 
Spencer C. Silvester 
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Proposed Order Prepared by: 
John P. Harrington (5242) 
SherilynA. 01sen(9418) 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
222 South Main Street, Suite 2200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)799-5800 
Facsimile: (801)799-5700 
Attorneys for Defendant Hornor, Townsend & Kent, Inc. 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SID HARVEY, CHARLENE JENSEN, 
SHARON.JULIANO, DIXON PEACOCK, 
BLAKE JONES, EDWARD HICKMAN, 
DONNA LEMMON, JIMMY V. HENRJE, 
GRANT B. HOWELL, TERRY L. JORDAN, 
RICHARD MANUS, TERESA MANUS, 
MICHAEL MARQUEZ, TERI MARQUEZ, 
ROBERT D. SWINBURNE, WYLMA 
TEMPLES, J. FRANK BURDICK, LORALIE 
THAYN and ELLA DEAN HUNTER, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
WORLD GROUP FINANCIAL, JAMES C. 
KULOW, JR., HORNOR, TOWNSEND & 
KENT INC., FRANK C. WHEELER, 
JEFFREY C. CAMPBELL, FIVE STAR 
FINANCIAL and DOES 1-10, 
CAMPBELL CASE 
[PROPOSED] ORDER REGARDING (1) 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ENTRY OF 
JUDGMENT; (2) DEFENDANT HTK'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE DECLARATIONS 
AND APPENDIX EXHIBITS SUBMITTED 
WITH MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION; AND (3) 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
Civil No. 060700588 
Judge Douglas B. Thomas 
Defendants. 
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Plaintiffs Jimmy V. Henrie, Grant B. Howell, Terry L. Jordan, Richard Manus, Teresa 
Manus, Michael Marquez, Teri Marquez, Robert D. Swinburne, Wylma Temples, J. Frank 
Burdick, Loralie Thayn and Ella Dean Hunter ("Plaintiffs") filed the following: 
1. Motion for Entry of Judgment and proposed Judgment dated November 19,2010. 
2. Motion for Reconsideration and Memorandum in Support dated November 19, 
2010 and Supplement to Memorandum, in Support of Reconsideration dated November 16,2010. 
Plaintiffs Grant B. Howell and Loralie Thayn did not join the Motion for Reconsideration and 
Memorandum in Support. 
Defendant Hornor Townsend & Kent, Inc. ("HTK") filed in response the following: 
1. Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for Entry of Judgment and Proposed Judgment 
dated January 10,2011. 
2. Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration filed January 12,2011. 
3. Motion to Strike Declarations of Frank Burdick, Jimmy Henrie, Ella Dean Hunter, 
Terry Jordan, Richard Manus, Teri Marquez, Robert Swinburne and Wylma Temples and 
Certain Appendix Exhibits Submitted with the Motion for Reconsideration and accompanying 
Memorandum filed January 10, 2011 ("Motion to Strike"). 
In response to HTK's Objections and Motion to Strike, Plaintiffs filed the following: 
1. Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Entry of Judgment dated 
January 31,2011, including the Declaration of Spencer Siebers in Support of Attorneys' Fees 
signed on January 31,2011 as Exhibit B to Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum. 
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2. Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Support of Reconsideration dated January 31, 
2011. 
3. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to HTK's Motion to Strike dated January 
31,2011. 
In response to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to HTK's Motion to Strike, HTK 
filed the following: 
1. HTK's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Declarations and 
Appendix Exhibits Submitted by Plaintiffs with the Motion for Reconsideration dated February 
22,2011. 
On March 22, 2011, the Court heard oral argument regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Entry 
of Judgment, Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration and HTK's Motion to Strike. Plaintiffs 
were represented by Fred R. Silvester of SILVESTER & CONROY. HTK was represented by John 
P. Harrington and Sherilyn A. Olsen of HOLLAND & HART LLP. After considering all of the 
pleadings, exhibits and materials cited above, the oral arguments of legal counsel, and good 
cause having been shown, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
Preliminary Findings of Fact and Judicial Notice 
With respect to the following, the Court makes the following findings of fact and takes 
judicial notice of the following: 
A. Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on March 6, 2006. 
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B, On February 14,2008, the Court entered its Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Separate Trials, whereby, the claims against Defendants James Kulow, World Financial Group, 
and World Group Securities asserted by Sid Harvey, Charlene Jensen, Sharon Juliano, Dixon 
Peacock, Blake Jones, Edward Hickman and Donna Lemmon were separated from the claims 
against Defendants Jeffrey C. Campbell, Frank Wheeler, Five Star Financial Group (a d/b/a of 
Jeffrey C. Campbell) and Defendant HTK (the "Campbell Case Defendants") asserted by Jimmy 
V. Henrie, Grant B. Howell, Terry L. Jordan, Richard Manus, Teresa Manus, Michael Marquez, 
Teri Marquez, Robert D. Swinburne, Wylma Temples, J. Frank Burdick, Loralie Thayn, and Ella 
Dean Hunter (the "Campbell Case Plaintiffs"). 
C. On June 16, 2009, the Court filed its Order granting HTK's Motion for Summary 
Judgment as to the Campbell Case Plaintiffs (i.e., Plaintiff Frank Burdick, Jimmy Henrie, Ella 
Dean Hunter, Richard and Teresa Manus, Terry L. Jordan, Michael and Teri Marquez, Wylma 
Temples, Loralie Thayn, and Robert D. Swinburne). 
D. Plaintiffs' claimed that Defendant Jeffrey C. Campbell and his d/b/a Five Star 
Financial sold unregistered securities in a reckless manner. Only the reckless sale of 
unregistered securities claim was tried to a jury in September 2010. The jury rendered a verdict 
in favor of the Campbell Case Plaintiffs and against Defendant Jeffrey C. Campbell and his d/b/a 
Five Star Financial Group on September 30,2010. 
Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Entry of Final Judgment 
1. On November 11,2010, Plaintiffs filed its Motion for Judgment and proposed 
Judgment as a result of the entry of a jury verdict against Defendant Jeffery Campbell and his 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
d/b/a Five Star Financial. Plaintiffs' claims against HTK were dismissed on summary judgment 
on June 16, 2009. The claims of Grant B. Howell were previously dismissed on January 11, 
2008, and the Motion to Set Aside the granting of summary judgment against Grant B. Howell 
was denied on June 16, 2009. 
2. The evidence presented by Campbell Case Plaintiffs with respect to the award of 
attorneys' fees pursuant to § 61-1-22, UTAH CODE ANN., including the Declaration of Mr. 
Spencer Siebers, has insufficient detail to permit the Court to make a factual determination as to 
the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees requested by Plaintiffs. Furthermore, the Declaration of 
Mr. Spencer Siebers indicates that a portion of the attorneys' fees incurred by Plaintiffs is 
attributable to work performed with respect to the claims against HTK. The award of attorneys' 
fees in this matter is limited to the prosecution of claims against Defendant Jeffrey C. Campbell 
and his d/b/a Five Star Financial, not HTK. The failure to segregate the work performed with 
respect to Defendant Jeffrey Campbell and his d/b/a Five Star Financial (as opposed to HTK) 
prevents the Court from being able to determine the reasonableness of attorneys' fees. The one-
third contingency fee agreement between the Campbell Case Plaintiffs and their counsel is not 
sufficient to establish the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees. 
3. The award of attorneys' fees as part of the proposed Judgment is therefore 
DENIED. 
4. As a result of the jury verdict against Defendant Jeffrey C. Campbell and his d/b/a 
Five Star Financial for the reckless sale of unregistered securities, the trebling of damages is 
permitted according to § 61-l-22(c), UTAH CODE ANN. which this Court will award in an amount 
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equal to three times the consideration paid for the security, together with interest, costs, and 
attorneys' fees, less any amounts paid. The only amount to be trebled is the consideration paid. 
Once the consideration paid is multiplied by three, then interest, costs and attorneys' fees shall 
be added thereto. Finally, the amounts repaid to Plaintiffs shall be subtracted from the total, 
which is expressed as: 
[(consideration paid X three) + interest, costs and attorneys' fees] 
less (-) amount repaid = total damages. 
5. The following damages with respect to Jeffrey C. Campbell, an individual and as 
a d/b/a of Five Star Financial are hereby GRANTED: 
z 
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Plaintiff 
(I Burdick 
II Henrie 
|| Howell 
|| Hunter 
II Jordan 
| Manus 
JMarquez 
1 Swinburne | 
1 Temples | 
Thayn 
Date 
Invested 
9/29/2003 
11/21/2002 
9/8/2003 
11/6/2002 
11/6/2002 
2/12/2003 
4/17/2003 
2/14/2003 
11/15/2002 
11/15/2002 
12/1/2002 
11/4/2002 
12/4/2002 
10/26/2003 
5/27/2003 
5/27/2003 
4/4/2003 J 
No. of 
Days to 
Verdict 
2558 
2870 
2579 
2885 
2885 
2787 
2723 
2785 
2876 
2876 
2860 
2887 
2857 
2531 1 
2683 
2683 
2736 
Orig. 
Consid. 
$43,581.46 
$114,983.69 
$15,000.00 
$23,124.00 
$32,021.77 
$45,000.00 
$14,311.45 
$197,530.47 
$37,294.35 
$42,471.42 
$23,000.00 
$50,000.00 
$35,706.64 
$10,000.00 
$59,507.45 
$40,492.55 
$25,000.00 
Treble 
Consid. 
$130,744.38 
$344,951.07 
$45,000.00 
$69,372.00 
$96,065.31 
$135,000.00 
$42,934.35 
$592,591.41 
$111,883.05 
$127,414.26 
$69,000.00 
$150,000.00 
$107,119.92 
$30,000.00 
$178,522.35 
$121,477.65 
$75,000.00 1 
Interest 
$36,651.41 
$108,494.20 
$12,718.36 
$21,932.96 
$30,372.43 
$41,232.33 
$12,812.08 
$180,862.15 
$35,263.09 
$40,158.18 
$21,626.30 
$47,457.53 
$33,538.81 
$8,321.10 
$52,490.46 
$35,717.76 
$22,487.67 | 
Less Funds 
Received 
-$8,182.54 
-$56,459.26 
$0.00 
-$18,894.13 
$0.00 
$0.00 
-$2,700.38 
-$78,084.25 
-$20,295.48 
-$3,465.00 
$0.00 
-$8,933.28 
-$8,623.27 
$0.00 
-$18,866.56 
$0.00 
-$3,144.99 J 
Sub Total 
$396,986.01 
$57,718.36 
$72,410.83 
$126,437.74 
$176,232.33 
$126,850.66 
$164,107.44 
$90,626.30 
$32,035.46 
$38,321.10 
$212,146.25 
$157,195.41 
94,342.68 | 
1 Total 1 
$159,213.25 
$454,704.37 
$375,080.89 
$53,046.05 
$695,369.31 1 
$381,584.40 
$188,524.25 
$170,356.55 
$369,341.66 
$94^42.68 1 
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6. Plaintiffs will submit a Judgment in conformity with this Order. 
Order Regarding HTK's Motion to Strike 
1. Attached to Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration were the declarations of 
Plaintiffs Frank Burdick, Jimmy Henrie, Ella Dean Hunter, Terry Jordan, Richard Manus, Teri 
Marquez, Robert Swinburne, and Wylma Temples (collectively, the "Declarations"). In 
addition, Plaintiffs submitted Central Registration Depository ("CRD") data summary pertaining 
to Defendant Jeffrey C. Campbell, the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") 
Notice to Members 01-79D, and FINRA arbitration resolutions (collectively, the "Appendix 
Pages"). 
2» The Declarations and Appendix Pages were available at the time of the summary 
judgment proceedings for presentation and consideration by the Court. No cognizable excuse, 
justification or reason was provided by Plaintiffs as to why the Declarations and Appendix Pages 
were not presented and submitted prior to the Court's entry of its Order filed on June 16,2009 
granting HTK's motions for summary judgment. Discovery in this lawsuit began in 2006 and 
was concluded on February 11,2008. HTK will be prejudiced if Plaintiffs are allowed to submit 
new evidence and declarations, whereby HTK would be forced to address evidence and issues 
that were not timely submitted prior to the entry of the Order dated June 16, 2009. 
3. The submission of the Declarations and Appendix Pages as part of Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Reconsideration is untimely and the Declarations and Appendix Pages will be 
stricken from the record. The Court will not consider the Declarations and Appendix Pages and 
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any new arguments based on the Declarations and Appendix Pages made by Plaintiffs after June 
16, 2009. Therefore, HTK's Motion to Strike Declarations and Appendix Pages is GRANTED. 
Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration 
1. After the entry of the jury verdict on September 29, 2010, the Court, sua sponte, 
requested farther briefing from Plaintiffs, Defendants and HTK as to whether the United States 
Supreme Court's ruling in Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds ("Aferdfc"), 130 S.Ct 1784 (2010), 
required reconsideration of the Court's ruling that the state securities claims of Plaintiffs Michael 
and Ten Marquez were barred by the applicable Utah Statute of Limitation. 
2. In response to the Court's request for briefing on the Merck case, Plaintiffs filed 
the Motion for Reconsideration, the Declarations and the Appendix Pages. 
3. In the Order filed on June 16, 2009 granting HTK's motions for summary 
judgment, the Court ruled in Paragraphs 78 through 84 as follows: 
78. HTK properly pled the statute of limitations as an 
affirmative defense pursuant to the standards set forth in Bangerter 
v. Petty, 2008 UT App 153, fl 18,184 P.3d 1249, 1253 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2008), cert, granted, No. 20080562, 2008 Utah Lexis 168, 
at*l (Utah Sept. 17,2008). 
79. More specifically, HTK properly pled the statute of 
limitations because the statute HTK relied upon is the same statute 
Plaintiffs relied upon in their Complaint. As such, the Plaintiffs 
were on sufficient notice as to the statute on which HTK was 
relying in its affirmative defense. 
80. Under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(a)(7), the statute of 
limitations on the State Security Claims is two years "after the 
discovery by the plaintiff of the facts constituting the 
violation " 
cn<c*7<o i r v v v c\ 
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{ 
81. As to Plaintiffs Mr. Burdick, Mr. Jordan, and Mr. and Mrs. 
Manus, there are genuine issues of fact regarding whether their 
State Security Claims are barred by the statute of limitations. 
82. As to Mr. and Mrs. Marquez, the undisputed material facts 
establish that on March 1,2004, Mr. and Mrs. Marquez learned 
directly from Mr. Campbell that BHDC's assets were frozen and 
that Mr. Fitzergerald "had taken off with all of the money . . . . " 
At this time, Mr. and Mis. Marquez had sufficient facts to put them 
on notice that they had a cause of action regarding the suitability of 
their investment, the safety of their investment, or the existence of 
their investment. 
83. Mr. and Mrs. Marquez did not file their State Security 
Claim until March 6,2006. Because this was more than two years 
after March 1, 2004, their State Security Claims are barred by the 
statute of limitations. 
84. HTK is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its 
defense that Mr. and Mrs. Marquez's State Security Claims are 
barred by the statute of limitations. 
4. In light of the Merck decision, the Court has reconsidered its Order of June 16, 
2009 and hereby modifies and amends the Order of June 16,2009 as follows: 
A. Paragraph 82 of the Order filed June 16,2009 shall be replaced in 
its entirety with the following new Paragraph 82: 
82. As to Mr. and Mrs. Marquez, the undisputed material facts 
establish that on March 1, 2004, Mr. and Mrs. Marquez learned 
directly from Mr. Campbell that BHDC's assets were frozen and 
that Mr. Fitzgerald "had taken off with all of the money " It is 
a question of fact, however, if Mr. and Mrs. Marquez had 
sufficient facts that they had a cause of action regarding the 
suitability of their investment, the safety of their investment, or the 
existence of their investment. There are genuine issues of fact 
regarding whether the State Security Claims of Mr. and Mrs. 
Marquez are barred by the statute of limitations. 
1 A 
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B. Paragraph 83 of the Order filed June 16, 2009 shall be replaced in 
its entirety with the following new Paragraph 83: 
83. The portions of HTK's Motions for Summary Judgment 
concerning the statute of limitations under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-
22(a)(7) are denied. 
C. Paragraph 84 of the Order filed June 16,2009 is hereby deleted in 
its entirety, shall not be replaced, and shall remain blank. 
5. Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED only with respect to the 
statute of limitations under UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-22(a)(7) pertaining to Mr. and Mrs. 
Marquez. 
6. The Court reconsidered Plaintiffs' claims that HTK is liable, as a principal, for the 
actions of Jeffrey C. Campbell, an individual doing business as Five Star Financial Group, as an 
agent of HTK, under the concept of apparent authority. The Court reaffirms for both legal and 
factual reasons its ruling regarding the concept of apparent authority set forth in its June 16,2009 
order Granting HTK's Motion for Summary Judgment in the Campbell Case. Therefore, 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED with respect to Plaintiffs' claims of apparent 
authority liability. 
7. The Court reconsidered Plaintiffs' claims that HTK is liable as a control person 
for the actions of Jeffrey C. Campbell, an individual doing business as Five Star Financial 
Group. Pursuant to this Court's Order Granting HTK's Motion to Strike, Plaintiffs' evidence 
and affidavits denominating HTK as a control person liability are stricken as untimely and are 
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not to be considered. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED with respect 
to Plaintiffs' claims that HTK is a control person. 
8. The Court reconsidered Plaintiffs' claims that HTK is liable for materially aiding 
Jeffrey C. Campbell, an individual doing business as Five Star Financial Group, in the sale of 
unregistered securities. The Court reaffirms for both legal and factual reasons its ruling 
regarding the concept of HTK having materially aided the sale of unregistered securities as set 
forth in its June 16,2009 order Granting HTK's Motion for Summary Judgment in the Campbell 
Case. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED with respect to Plaintiffs' 
claims that HTK is liable for materially aiding Jeffrey C. Campbell, an individual doing business 
as Five Star Financial Group, in the sale of unregistered securities. 
9. The Court reconsidered Plaintiffs' claims that HTK acted negligently. The Court 
reaffirms for both legal and factual reasons its ruling regarding Plaintiffs' claim that HTK acted 
negligently. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED with respect to 
Plaintiffs' claims that HTK acted negligently. 
10. All other matters, issues and arguments for which Plaintiffs have requested 
reconsideration are DENIED. 
DATED this . J> dafof May, 2011. 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Fred R. Silvester 
Spencer C. Siebers 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jimmy V. Henrie,' 
Grant B. Howell, Terry L. Jordan, Richard Manns, 
Teresa Manns, Michael Marquez, Teri Marquez, 
Robert D. Swinburne, Wylma Temples, J. Frank Burdick, 
Lor die Thayn and Ella Dean Hunter 
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MAY 24 2011 
Fred R. Silvester (3862) 
Spencer Siebers (8320) 
SILVESTER & CONROY, L.C. 
1371 East 2100 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Telephone: (801)532-2266 
Facsimile: (801) 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Frank Burdick, Jimmy Henrie, Grant B. Howell, Ella Dean Hunter, 
Terry Jordan, Richard and Teresa Manus, Michael and Teri Marqitez, Robert Swinburne, 
Wylma Temples and Loralie Thayn 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SID HARVEY, CHARLENE JENSEN, 
SHARON JULIANO, DIXON PEACOCK, 
BLAKE JONES, EDWARD HICKMAN, 
DONNA LEMMON, JIMMY V. HENRIE, 
GRANT B. HOWELL, TERRY L. JORDAN, 
RICHARD MANUS, TERESA MANUS, 
MICHAEL MARQUEZ, TERI lVLARQUEZ, 
ROBERT D. SWINBURNE, WYLMA | 
TEMPLES, J. FRANK BURDICK, LORALIE 
THAYN and ELLA DEAN HUNTER, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
WORLD GROUP FINANCIAL, JAMES C. 
KULOW, JR., HORNOR, TOWNSEND & 
KENT INC., FRANK C. WHEELER, 
JEFFREY C. CAMPBELL, FIVE STAR 
FINANCIAL and DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
CAMPBELL CASE 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 060700588 
Judge Douglas B. Thomas 
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This action came on for trial before a jury and the Court, Honorable Douglas B. Thomas, 
Seventh Judicial District Judge, presiding, and the issues having been duly tried and the jury 
having rendered its verdict on September 30, 2010, 
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED THAT: 
Frank Burdick 
1. Plaintiff J. Frank Burdick recover from Defendants Jeffrey C. Campbell, an 
individual doing business as (d/b/a) Five Star Financial Group, the consideration paid by Frank 
Burdick for the security (i.e., $43,581.45) as trebled pursuant to § 61-l-22(c), UTAH CODE ANN., 
which equals 5130,744.38; 
2. , With interest of 12% on the consideration paid for the security as of September 
29, 2003, or $36,651.41; 
3. Less amounts received of $8,182.54; 
4. For atotal of $159,213.25; 
Jimmy Henrie 
5. Plaintiff Jimmy V. Henrie recover from Defendant Jeffrey C. Campbell, an 
individual doing business as (d/b/a) Five Star Financial Group, the consideration paid by Jimmy 
V. Henrie for the securities (i.e., $114,983.69 and $15,000.00) as trebled pursuant to § 61-1-
22(c), UTAH CODE ANN., or $389,951.07 ($344,951.07 and $45,000.00); 
6. With interest of 12% on the consideration paid for the securities as of November 
21, 2002 and September 8, 2003), or $121,212.56; 
7. Less amounts received of $56,459.26; 
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8. For a total of $454,704.37; 
Grant B. Howeli 
9. Plaintiff Grant B. Howell recover from Defendant Jeffrey C. Campbell, an 
individual doing business as (d/b/a) Five Star Financial Group, the consideration paid by Grant 
B. Howell (i.e., $23,12.4.00, $32,021.77 and $45,000.00) as trebled pursuant to § 61-1-22(c), 
UTAHCODEANN., or $300,437.31; 
10. With interest of 12% on the consideration paid for the securities as of November 
6, 2002 and February 12, 2003, or $93,537.72; 
11. Less amounts received of $18,894.13; 
12. For a total of $375,080.89; 
Ella Dean Hunter 
13. Plaintiff Ella Dean Hunter recover from Defendant Jeffrey C. Campbell, an 
individual doing business as (d/b/a) Five Star Financial Group, the consideration paid by Ella 
Dean Hunter (i.e., $14,311.45) as trebled pursuant to § 61-l-22(c), UTAH CODE ANN., or 
$42,934.35: 
14. With interest of 12% on the consideration paid by Ella Dean Hunter for the 
securities as of April 17, 2003, or $12,812.08; 
15. Less amounts received of $2,700.38; 
16. For a total of $53,046.05; 
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Terry Jordan 
17. Plaintiff Terry Jordan recover from Defendant Jeffrey C. Campbell, an individual 
doing business as (d/b/a) Five Star Financial Group, the consideration paid by Terry Jordan for 
the securities (i.e., $197,530.47) trebled pursuant to § 61-l-22(c), UTAH CODE ANN., or 
$592,591.41; 
18. With interest of 12% on the consideration paid by Terry Jordan for the securities 
as of February 14, 2003, or $180,862.15: 
19. Less amounts received of $78,084.25; 
20. For atotal of $695,369.31; 
Richard and Teresa Manus 
21. Plaintiffs Richard and Teresa Manus recover from Defendant Jeffrey C. 
Campbell, an individual doing business as (d/b/a) Five Star Financial Group, the consideration 
paid by Richard and Teresa Manus (i.e., $37,294.35, $42,471.42 and $23,000.00) trebled 
pursuant to § 61-l-22(c), UTAH CODE ANN., or $308,297.31; 
22. With interest of 12% on the consideration paid by Richard and Teresa Manus as 
of November 15,2002 and December 1, 2002, or $97,047.57; 
23. Less amounts received of $23,760.48; 
24. For atotal of $381,584.40; 
Michael and Teri Marquez 
25. Plaintiffs Michael and Teri Marquez recover from Defendant Jeffrey C. 
Campbell, an individual doing business as (d/b/a) Five Star Financial Group, consideration paid 
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by Michael and Teri Marquez for the securities (i.e., $50,000.00) trebled pursuant to § 61-1-
22(c), UTAH CODE ANN., or $150,000.00; 
26. With interest of 12% on the consideration paid Michael and Teri Marquez as of 
November 4, 2002, or $47,457.53; 
27. Less amounts received of $8,933.28; 
28. For atotal of $188,524.25; 
Robert Swinburne 
29. Plaintiff Robert Swinburne recover from Defendant Jeffrey C. Campbell, an 
individual doing business as (d/b/a) Five Star Financial Group, consideration paid by Robert 
Swinburne (i.e., $35,706.64 and $10,000.00) trebled pursuant to § 61-l-22(c), UTAH CODE ANN., 
or $137,119.92; 
30. With interest of 12% on the consideration paid by Robert Swinburne as of 
December 4, 2002 and October 26, 2003, or $41,859.91; 
31. Less amounts received of $8,623.27; 
32. For atotal of $170,356.55; 
Wylma Temples 
33. Plaintiff Wylma Temples recover from Defendant Jeffrey C. Campbell, an 
individual doing business as (d/b/a) Five Star Financial Group, consideration paid by Wylma 
Temples (i.e., $59,507.45 and $40,492.55) trebled pursuant to § 61-l-22(c), UTAH CODE ANN., 
or $300,000.00; 
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34. With interest of 12% on the consideration paid by Wylma Temples for the 
securities as of May 27, 2003, or $88,208.22; 
35. Less amounts received of $18,866.56; 
36. For a total of $369,341.66; 
Loralie Thayn 
37. Plaintiff Loralie Thayn recover from Defendant Jeffrey C. Campbell, an 
individual doing business as (d/b/a) Five Star Financial Group, consideration paid by Loralie 
Thayn ($25,000.00) trebled pursuant to § 61-l-22(c), UTAH CODE ANN, or $75,000.00; 
38. With interest of 12% on the consideration paid by Loralie Thayn as of April 4, 
2003, or 522,487.67; 
39. Less amounts received of $3,144.99; 
40. For a total of $94,342.68; 
DATED this ^ r ^ O - day of May. 2011. 
BY THE COURT 
Honorable Douala aomas 
Seventh Judicial District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this \[y day of May, 2011,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Judgment to be served via First Class United States mail postage prepaid to the 
following;: 
Jeffrey C. Campbell and Five Star Financial 
2288 Bryson Circle 
Santa Clara UT 84765-5429 
John Harrington 
Sherilyn A. Olsen 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
222 S Main St ste 2200 
SALT LAKE CITYUT 84101-2194 
Attorney for Hornor Townsend & Kent 
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U.C.A. 1953 §61-1-22 Page 1 
C 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 61. Securities Division-Real Estate Division 
K
m Chapter 1. Utah Uniform Securities Act (Refs & Annos) 
-* § 61-1-22. Sales and purchases in violation—Remedies—Limitation of actions 
(l)(a) This Subsection (1) applies to a person who: 
(i) offers or sells a security in violation of: 
(A) Subsection 61-1-3(1); 
(B) Section 61-1-7; 
(C) Subsection 61-1-17(2); 
(D) a rule or order under Section 61-1-15, which requires the affirmative approval of 
sales literature before it is used ; or 
(E) a condition imposed under Subsection 61-1-10(4) or 61-1-11(7); or 
(ii) offers, sells, or purchases a security in violation of Subsection 61-1-1(2). 
(b) A person described in Subsection (l)(a) is liable to a person selling the security to or 
buying the security from the person described in Subsection (l)(a). The person to whom the 
person described in Subsection (l)(a) is liable may sue either at law or in equity to recover 
the consideration paid for the security, together with interest at 12% per year from the date 
of payment, costs, and reasonable attorney fees, less the amount of income received on the 
security, upon the tender of the security or for damages if the person no longer owns the se-
curity. 
(c) Damages are an amount calculated as follows: 
(i) subtract from the amount that would be recoverable upon a tender under Subsection 
(7)(b) the value of the security when the buyer disposed of the security; and 
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(ii) add to the amount calculated under Subsection (l)(c)(i) interest at: 
(A) 12% per year : 
(I) beginning the day on which the security is purchased by the buyer; and 
(II) ending on the date of disposition ; and 
(B) after the period described in Subsection (l)(c)(ii)(A), 12% per year on the amount 
lost at disposition. 
(2) The court in a suit brought under Subsection (1) may award an amount equal to three times 
the consideration paid for the security, together with interest, costs, and attorney fees, less any 
amounts, all as specified in Subsection (1) upon a showing that the violation was reckless or 
intentional. 
(3) A person who offers or sells a security in violation of Subsection 61-1-1(2) is not liable 
under Subsection (l)(a) if the purchaser knew of the untruth or omission, or the seller did not 
know and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known of the untrue statement or 
misleading omission. 
(4)(a) Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller or buyer liable under Subsec-
tion (1), every partner, officer, or director of such a seller or buyer, every person occupying a 
similar status or performing similar functions, every employee of such a seller or buyer who 
materially aids in the sale or purchase, and every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in 
the sale or purchase are also liable jointly £ind severally with and to the same extent as the 
seller or purchaser, unless the nonseller or nonpurchaser who is so liable sustains the burden 
of proof that the nonseller or nonpurchaser did not know, and in exercise of reasonable care 
could not have known, of the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged 
to exist. 
(b) There is contribution as in cases of contract among the several persons so liable. 
(5) A tender specified in this section may be made at any time before entry of judgment. 
(6) A cause of action under this section survives the death of a person who might have been a 
plaintiff or defendant. 
(7)(a) An action may not be maintained to enforce liability under this section unless brought 
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before the earlier of: 
(i) the expiration of five years after the act or transaction constituting the violation; or 
(ii) the expiration of two years after the discovery by the plaintiff of the facts constituting 
the violation. 
(b) A person may not sue under this section if: 
(i) the buyer or seller received a written offer, before suit and at a time when the buyer or 
seller owned the security, to refund the consideration paid together with interest at 12% 
per year from the date of payment, less the amount of any income received on the security, 
and the buyer or seller failed to accept the offer within 30 days of its receipt; or 
(ii) the buyer or seller received such an offer before suit and at a time when the buyer or 
seller did not own the security, unless the buyer or seller rejected the offer in writing with-
in 30 days of its receipt. 
(8) A person who has made or engaged in the performance of any contract in violation of this 
chapter or any rule or order issued under this chapter, or who has acquired a purported right 
under any such contract with knowledge of the facts by reason of which its making or per-
formance was in violation, may not base a suit on the contract. 
(9) A condition, stipulation, or provision binding a person acquiring a security to waive com-
pliance with this chapter or a rule or order issued under this chapter is void. 
(10)(a) The rights and remedies provided by this chapter are in addition to any other rights or 
remedies that may exist at law or in equity. 
(b) This chapter does not create a cause of action not specified in this section or Subsection 
61-1-4(6). 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1963, c. 145, § 1; Laws 1979, c. 218, § 7; Laws 1983, c. 284. § 32; Laws 1986, c. 107, § 
2; Laws 1990, c. 133, § 15; Laws 1991, c. 161, § 14; Laws 1998, c. 13, § 62, eff. May 4, 1998; 
Laws 2006, 3rd Sp.Sess., c. 4, § 3, eff. May 26, 2006; Laws 2007, c. 292, § 3, eff. April 30, 
2007; Laws 2009, c. 351, § 22, eff. May 12, 2009. 
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